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Abstract
Personal mobile devices are rapidly enhancing their functionalities. Not limited to phone
and text messages, they oﬀer web browsing via the Internet, free to install applications on
the users’ requests, play musics and videos, etc. Now they are capable of running multiple
OS instances with support of virtualization. Like the use in desktop/enterprise systems,
virtualization for embedded mobile devices allows consolidating multiple OS instances
and enhancing the security of hosted OS environment. In addition, there are applications
specific to embedded systems such as hosting real-time OS (RTOS) and application OS
(GPOS) concurrently without spoiling the real-time responsiveness of the RTOS.
There is no doubt that virtualization brings many benefits to the embedded mobile
devices, however virtualization is not a panacea. Additional layer of virtualization incurs
additional complexity to the software stack of devices. Some extra engineering eﬀorts of
developing such device might make the system prone to bugs and security risks. In this
dissertation we take the position that some applications of embedded virtualization can be
supported with more light-weight methods. The methods leverages architecture specific
features that are common or expected to be common among embedded mobile devices.
We first focus on real-time and application OS consolidation, for which we propose a thin
abstraction layer that achieves better interrupt responsiveness than virtualization. Next
we focus on hosting a kernel integrity monitor for rootkit detection. The monitor is hosted
within an isolated memory region that is protected by means of processor architecture.
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Introduction
Personal mobile devices are rapidly enhancing their functionalities. Not limited to phone
and text messages, they oﬀer web browsing via the Internet, free to install applications on
the users’ requests, play musics and videos, etc. At this point writing this thesis the latest
device is equipped with multiple processor cores run with over 1.4GHz frequency and a
gigabyte of memory [6]. This outstrips the performance of desktop computers those were
available in 1990s.
As their hardware advances, now they are capable of running multiple OS instances
with support of virtualization [9, 17, 32]. Like the use in desktop/enterprise systems,
virtualization for embedded mobile devices allows consolidating multiple OS instances
and enhancing the security of hosted OS environment. In addition, there are applications
specific to embedded systems such as hosting real-time OS (RTOS) and application OS
(GPOS) concurrently without spoiling the real-time responsiveness of the RTOS. These
benefits of virtualization motivated the ARM architecture to add a hardware virtualization
support to their upcoming instruction set architecture (ISA) [62].
1.1 Motivation
There is no doubt that virtualization brings many benefits to the embedded mobile de-
vices, however virtualization is not a panacea. Additional layer of virtualization incurs
additional complexity to the software stack of devices. The hypervisor should be designed
carefully to achieve reasonable performance. The straightforward port of an existing hy-
pervisor from the desktop/enterprise field to embedded field does not perform well [34].
Extra engineering eﬀorts of developing such device might make the system prone to bugs
and security risks. In Chapter 2, we discuss the advantages and disadvantage of using
hypervisors for embedded systems to accomodate multiple OS kernels in detail.
In this dissertation we take the position that some applications of embedded vir-
tualization can be supported with more light-weight methods. The hybrid architecture
[24, 66, 44, 59] and the logical partitioning of OS kernels [54] suggest the feasibility of
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running multiple-OS system without support of hypervisors. Traditional pure-hypervisor
based virtualization requires explicit splitting of the privilege level of a hypervisor and
guest OSes. Instead we discuss methodologies for accommodating multiple-OS instances
without help of a hypervisor layer. Limiting our goal to support real-time scheduling in
multi-OS architecture and guaranteeing safe execution of security monitor, we leverage
virtualization technologies and some architectural support to achieve our goal.
1.2 Contributions
There are two contributions in this dissertation:
• We first focus on real-time and application OS consolidation, running a real-time
OS (RTOS) and an application OS (or GPOS: general-purpose OS) concurrently on
a single mobile device. For which we propose a thin abstraction layer SPUMONE
that achieves better interrupt responsiveness than virtualization. SPUMONE tries
to minimize the modifications to the guest kernels alongside the implementation size
of the virtualization layer itself. We also leveraged the architectural feature of the
experimental platform to mitigate the aﬀect of the GPOS’s activities to the real-time
responsiveness of the RTOS.
• Next we focus on hosting a kernel integrity monitor for rootkit detection. The
monitor is hosted within an isolated memory region that is protected by means of
processor architecture. We propose the limited local-memory (LLM) architecture
that guarantees safe execution under a privileged processor core without support of
a hypervisor layer.
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of this dissertation. In the next chapter we discuss
the tradeoﬀs of using virtualization in embedded systems. In Chapter 3, we first show
our experience on running RTOS and GPOS on a embedded system VM that shows the
overhead put into the interrupt handling. Chapter 4 follows the previous chapter, which
introduces our light-weight virtualization technology that tries to eliminate the delay that
we found in the experiment. The proposed methods minimize the interrupt delay caused
by the interference of the application OS. In Chapter 5 we propose a method to run a
security monitor without support of a hypervisor which requires a slight modification the
architecture. Finally Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Discussions on Embedded System
Virtualization
In this chapter, we introduce the advantages and disadvantages of using a hypervisor in
embedded systems, in order to backup the motivation of our proposal on running multiple
OS without help of a hypervisor.
2.1 The Use of Embedded System Virtualization
Mobile devices are capable of running multiple OS instances hosted by a hypervisor.
The applications of hypervisors in the embedded systems are diﬀerent from those in the
desktop/enterprise world. The following describes the two major applications.
• Real-time scheduling. A hypervisor is leveraged for consolidating an application
OS and a real-time control OS. A modern system-on-chip (SoC) for mobile devices
equips application and baseband processors [7]. A baseband processor is in charge of
handling mobile telecommunication signals, which usually runs a real-time OS that
can handle interrupts within a hundred microsecond or even faster. Consolidating
control and applications OSes to run concurrently on a single processor, the silicon
vendor has an opportunity to simplify the design of the SoC. For this application,
the hypervisor should be designed carefully to deliver interrupts with a reasonably
small delay and to preserve the execution time of the tasks running on the RTOS.
Type I hypervisor [51] is used to support this application. OKL4 [4] and virtualLogix
VLX [9] are designed as type I hypervisor.
• Security enhancement. Virtualization may enhance the mobile device security
[31]. OS can contain malicious attacks within the isolated virtual machine, not to
propagate it to the remainder of the system, even when if the attacker promotes
itself to the privileged mode. Since mobile devices are connected to the internet, as
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the desktop/enterprise computers, we need to protect them from security attacks.
Especially rootkits that stays in the system for long period of time can collect private
informations.
Note that for the use in embedded systems, hypervisors need to support only a
limited and fixed number of guests. For the enterprise use, it is worth running a number
of application OS instances, however it is not always useful for personal users in embedded
systems. A personal never use a second and a third Android unless paranoid about one’s
privacy, or using it in business. Some vendors use their hypervisors to integrate personal
and business use cell-phones into a single device [17, 8]. Enterprises lend business phones
to their employees, because personal phones may risk their security and confidentiality.
Virtualization allows to install a virtual instance of a business phone into the personal
phone, with which the second physical device would be unnecessary. An example of hosting
two instances of Android OS is shown in [17]. Even in this case, they host guests up to two
instances. Giving freedom of forking a number of virtual machines requires multiplexing
the underlying peripherals and supporting virtual peripherals, which is diﬃcult engineering
because the hardware of the mobile devices varies from product to product. They use
customized SoC that equips numbers of non-standardized controllers.
We take the position that an embedded system hypervisor does not require the rich
functionalities we can find in the desktop/enterprise systems. Focusing our applications
to the real-time support and security enhancement it is not necessary to host a complete
symmetric OSes on an embedded device. Our proposal in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 limits
the use of OSes. RTOS accesses devices those are not used by the application OS, therefore
it is unnecessary to virtualize peripherals. For the security purpose, the security monitor
should run independently from the target OS in order to protect it from compromised
by rootkits and to detect data inconsistencies. Eliminating some surplus features may
contribute to simplify the design and the implementation of achieving the requirements,
thus we claim these constraints and assumptions are reasonable for our background and
challenges.
2.2 Performance and Real-time Responsiveness
As discussed in [14] one of the primary requirements of hardware virtualization is low
overhead. This is common among embedded and desktop/enterprise environment. Since
embedded systems provide less computation power than desktop/enterprise systems, the
overhead of virtualization is more critical. One of the main sources of the overhead of
virtualizing hardware is the trapping between a hypervisor and guest kernels for instruction
emulations. Another cause of the virtualization overhead is spatial isolation among guest
kernels. Switching the execution of virtual machines entails extra cache flushes and TLB
misses.
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In addition to low overhead, embedded systems also require real-time responsive-
ness. A hypervisor like Xen [16] schedules its virtual machines with a time-sharing based
manner which harm the responsiveness of the guest OS. In addition, co-existing OSes
may interfere the behavior of each other which may incur deadline misses. It is crucial to
minimize the overhead of a hypervisor but also to minimize the aﬀect of scheduling from
the application OS to the real-time OS. In Chapter 3 we measured the real-time delay of
a RTOS running on top of a hypervisor concurrently with a GPOS.
Hartig et al. [30] constructed a microkernel based system consisting of a real-time
server and Linux running on top of L4 microkernel and investigated how to contain Linux’s
activity not to aﬀect the real-time server. They modified Linux not to block the interrupts
of processor and leveraged cache coloring to force exclusive usage of cache memory. In
Chapter 4 we propose our method of reducing the real-time delay of a virtualized RTOS.
2.3 Engineering Cost
Because of the absence of the hardware virtualization support by embedded processors,
a commodity embedded system hypervisor adopts para-virtualization technique. The
ARMv7 architecture has a number of instructions that do not trap in the user-mode but
their behaviors rely on the privileged state of the processor. These instructions are called
sensitive instructions [52]. In the terminology introduced by the early research on the vir-
tualization by Popek and Goldberg [51], ARMv7 is not a virtualizable architecture. These
sensitive instructions can be virtualized by dynamic translation [57, 19], replace with the
help of compilers [41] and rewriting them by hand which is known as para-virtualization
[65, 16]. Para-virtualization requires the modification of guest OS kernels, which entails
engineering cost of replacing sensitive instructions with emulating instructions and trap
into the hypervisor.
A number of enterprise servers and desktop computers may share the same para-
virtualized OS. This can be also benefit in embedded systems which use the same GPOS,
but the RTOS varies from manufacturers to manufacturers and products to products.
Considering various combinations of RTOSes and GPOSes, even though the engineering
cost of constructing a single hybrid system is claimed to be small enough, the engineering
cost for supporting various combinations of RTOSes and GPOSes would still introduce a
great engineering eﬀort.
Constructing Multi-OS environment needs to balance the engineering cost and the
overhead. An ideal hypervisor may not require modifications to guest OSes [31]. The
drawbacks of engineering cost in the para-virtulization is not found in full-virtualization.
Full virtualization exposes an interface identically to underlying hardware. However it
introduces large overhead to guest OSes. In addition, it requires vast modifications to the
ISA of processor cores, which might be available only for some high-end SoC products
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that consumes more processor power and dominates larger area on the chip.
Hybrid kernels reduce these overheads by putting OS kernels in the same privileged
mode. They run a GPOS kernel as a task on a RTOS kernel. The underlying RTOS can
handle interrupts in real-time while running the GPOS as a non-real-time task of it. The
drawback of the hybrid approach is the modification required to the guest kernel running
on top of the RTOS. Since the RTOS exposes the binary interface diﬀerent from the one
of the underlying processor, the architectural part should be replaced by the API of the
RTOS.
This motivated us to develop a light-weight abstraction layer that leverage architec-
tural features that requires simple extensions to the processor and some features expected
to be ubiquitous among future embedded processors. We also try to minimize the modifi-
cation to hosted OS kernels, which allows adopting various combinations of RTOSes and
GPOSes with reasonable engineering eﬀort. We introduce the design of our virtualization
layer SPUMONE in Chapter 4 which minimizes the required modifications to the guest
OS kernels.
2.4 Security
Strong isolation among OSes is an attractive feature for constructing a secure and reliable
embedded system[31]. One of the approaches is to oﬀer the spatial isolation in embedded
systems is to use the microkernel. However, supporting spatial isolation with reasonable
overhead requires a large amount of modification to the OS kernels. Also, for making IPC
predictable, microkernels need to integrate IPC and synchronization, and it makes the
microkernel complex and IPC slow as described in [47].
Despite the wide adoption as a research platform of security researches, a hypervisor
itself is also the target of security attacks. As their functionality extends, hypervisor have
increased their code size; now they are prone to vulnerabilities. We can find vulnerability
reports on Xen and VMware at National Vulnerability Database [3]. Some vulnerabilities
report the possibility of malware subverting the hypervisor layer, which means capable of
gaining the complete control over the system.
In order to enhance the security of a virtualized system, it is crucial to minimize its
attack surface by reducing the size and complexity of the hypervisor layer. The microker-
nel design can simplify the design of the hypervisor layer [32, 56]. Microkernels expose a
well-defined programming interface, that are high-level abstraction of physical resources.
Processors are virtualized as threads and tasks, memory management is virtualized as
map/unmap function, interrupts are virtualized as IPCs, etc. These high-level API re-
quires para-virtualization of guest kernels which is larger engineering eﬀort than replacing
sensitive instructions. Furthermore, a simple design enables verification of the microker-
nel. seL4 adopted formal verification to a microkernel [38]. It accomplished developing
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a bug free hypervisor, however it is applicable under strict limitations. For instance, in
seL4’s implementation, interrupts are replaced with polling on a signal, which introduce
unpredictable delay into the interrupt delivery. This limitation disallows hosting real-time
tasks on the microkernel.
In Chapter 5 we work on a method to protect a security module that runs beside
the target without the support of a hypervisor.
9
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Chapter 3
Microkernel-based Multi-OS
Architecture
The emergence of functional embedded systems such as cell-phones and digital appliances
brought up a new issue, building a system that supports both real-time and rich services.
One of the solutions is leveraging a hypervisor to integrate a real-time operating sys-
tem (RTOS) and an application operating system (or GPOS: general-purpose operating
system) into a single device. In this chapter we report our experience on developing a
preliminary setup of such solution with a real-world machine. We reveal sources of the
overheads in the pure-hypervisor based multi-OS environment in order to discuss the de-
sign of multi-OS environment suitable for embedded system, which we introduce in the
next chapter. We constructed a prototype system with an existing hypervisor, an RTOS,
and a GPOS, measured some basic overheads. The experiments show that the GPOS’s
activities entail non-negligible overhead to the delay of interrupts sent to the RTOS.
3.1 Background
In recent years, as seen in cell-phones and digital appliances, the scale and the complexity
of softwares for embedded systems are increasing rapidly. These devices integrate large and
complex softwares supporting functions such as network, multimedia and GUI. Despite
the expansion of the software scale, software development time cycle is shortened, which
entails bugs and insuﬃcient reliability to their products. Developers are trying to leverage
platforms and middleware to increase software reusability and also to extend an embedded
OSes to support memory protection mechanism to increase their reliabilities. However,
still the cost of their software engineering and testing is high.
To overcome these problems, GPOSes, originally targeting desktop/enterprise sys-
tems, are ported to embedded systems and already widely used. A typical example is
Linux[61]. By using GPOSes in embedded systems, a wide variety of applications, net-
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work protocols, libraries and middlewares developed in desktop/enterprise systems can be
reused. Also they provide a memory protection mechanism which can isolate applications
to increase the system reliability.
While there are various advantages leveraging GPOSes in embedded systems, some
technical challenges remain. A small memory footprint, short bootup time, and especially
a real-time scheduling is one of the most challenging issue. There are still many eﬀorts
being made to shorten their response time. For instance, Molnar developed the real-time
preemption patch [45] for Linux, which reduces the response time of the Linux kernel by
making it preemptible. According to the analysis of Abeni et al.[13], the maximum kernel
latency would be 28 milliseconds (ms) in traditional Linux, and 17 ms in Linux with
the preemption patch. Even though applying the patch to the kernel, Linux still cannot
achieve a few microseconds latency which is generally supported by embedded RTOSes
used in traditional embedded systems.
Cell-phones balance real-time responsiveness and rich functionality by using some
additional processors. A RTOS and a GPOS run simultaneously on their own dedicated
set of a processor and memory. Modern cell-phones integrate these processors and memory
into a single system-on-chip (SoC) [7]. However, an additional processor increases the price
of the product by dominating some area on the chip. Even if the price of a single processor
is a few dollars, cell-phones are sold in order of hundred thousands, so the resulting total
production cost cannot be negligible.
In recent years, leveraging hypervisor in embedded systems has been focused to
overcome these problems. A hypervisor enables integrating RTOS with low latency and
GPOSes with rich services by running both of them simultaneously in a single device.
Some early researches on consolidating a RTOS and a GPOS on a single embedded device
are done by the ERTOS1 group at NICTA2, developed Iguana[1], an L4 microkernel-
based embedded real-time platform, and Wombat[40], para-virtualized Linux which runs
in Iguana. Oikawa et al. also ported a RTOS to the L4 microkernel and to their own
hypervisor. They evaluated the overhead of interrupt handling[49, 48]. The result shows
that the overhead can be kept small enough. By giving a higher fixed priority to a
virtualized RTOS, the real-time tasks reside in the RTOS can preserve their short response
time. The hypervisor model let multiple OSes to share a single processor, which results
in reducing the number of processors implemented on a device.
In this chapter, we introduce our experience on developing a multi-OS system that
hosts a RTOS and a GPOS on an embedded system hypervisor. We used the above
research contributions, the L4 microkernel, Wombat, Iguana. As a RTOS, we ported the
work of para-virtualizing TOPPERS by Oikawa et al. that runs on the older version
of the L4 microkernel to the latest version at the time. We evaluated the overhead of
1Embedded and Real-Time Operating Systems (http://www.ertos.nicta.com.au/)
2National ICT Australia (http://nicta.com.au/)
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virtualization especially the interrupt latency on real-world hardware.
We also work on the problem that dispatching the RTOS prior to the GPOS in
hypervisor-based systems limits real-time task deployment between guest operating sys-
tems. The task scheduling by a hypervisor is done in a unit of an OS, so it does not
care about the priorities of the tasks running in guest OSes; therefore, all the high priority
tasks should reside in the RTOS, and the remaining low priority tasks in the GPOS. There
do exist applications for an RTOS which do not require high priority, and applications
for a GPOS which requires high priority (Figure 3.1 (a)) such as an video player. There-
fore we propose a task grain scheduling which enables a scheduling in a unit of a task
by a hypervisor; even tasks are deployed in diﬀerent guest OSes they can be prioritized
(Figure 3.1 (b)). The proposed scheduling scheme shall increase the flexibility of the real-
time task deployment in a hypervisor based multi-OS system, which leads to increasing
the reusability of low priority applications for RTOSes and high priority applications for
GPOSes.
Figure 3.1: Task grain scheduling
The next section introduces some related work. Section 3.2 introduces the im-
plementation of our prototype system. Section 3.4.3 introduces the design of the task
grain scheduling. Section 3.4 introduces the results of the evaluation. Finally Section 3.6
summarizes this chapter.
3.2 Implementation
We built a prototype system with L4-embedded[2] as a hypervisor, Wombat as a guest
GPOS, and TOPPERS/JSP 1.3 as a guest RTOS. In this section, we briefly introduce the
hypervisor and the guest OSes, and describe how we implemented the task grain scheduling
in our prototype system.
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3.2.1 L4-embedded
L4-embedded (L4 in following sentences) is a microkernel which shares some common
features with a hypervisor. It has a capability to run para-virtualized OSes. Wombat
is one of them, a para-virtualized Linux runs on L4. L4 supports IA-32, ARM, MIPS,
and PPC architectures. This time, we implemented our prototype system in the IA-32
architecture version of L4.
The main functions provided by L4 are thread management, memory management,
inter process communication (IPC), and interrupt handling. Their detail follows.
• Thread management. A thread is a unit of scheduling done by L4. The scheduling
algorithm is fixed priority preemptive scheduling. Each one of the threads has its
own context. The usages of threads in virtualized guest OSes are described in Section
3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3.
• Memory management. L4 provides some flexible memory management functions
to user space applications, creating a memory space, mapping and unmapping page
frames between memory spaces, etc. Multiple threads can reside in a single mem-
ory space. Wombat leverages these functions to manage address spaces since the
functions provides features equivalent to an MMU.
• IPC. Data passing and synchronization between threads are done by IPC. The IPC
function provided by L4 can be preformed either with or without passing data. In
addition, IPC can be performed without blocking (asynchronous IPC). Also software
interrupts and processor exceptions are translated to IPC message by L4, and sent to
corresponding threads. Systems calls and page faults triggered by Wombat processes
are handled by using this mechanism.
• Interrupt. Hardware interrupts are passed to threads as IPC messages from pseudo
IRQ threads. To which thread a specific interrupt is notified, is set by L4 API. Gen-
erally, a thread which handles an interrupt is blocking to receive an IPC message
from an interrupt source. When the thread has the highest priority than all other
active threads (threads in ready state), it is dispatched immediately receiving the
interrupt message. The interrupt from the same source is masked until the thread
sends back a reply message to the corresponding IRQ thread.
• Device Servers. When a hardware is shared by multiple applications running on
L4, the access to the hardware is arbitrated by using a device server. If a thread
wants to access a hardware, it sends and receives IPC messages to corresponding
device server. Since an interrupt message cannot be sent to multiple threads at the
same time, a shared interrupt message is first sent to the device server, and then
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Figure 3.2: Wombat
sent to the threads. For instance, a timer interrupt is generally used by numbers of
OSes. In our prototype system it is used by both Wombat and L4/TOPPERS, so
the interrupt is first sent to timer server, then to one of them.
3.2.2 Wombat
Wombat is a para-virtualized Linux which runs as a server on L4. Wombat we used in the
prototype is based on Linux 2.6.10. It can run unmodified Linux applications.
Wombat Threads
Wombat consists of multiple L4 threads. In this section, we describe the role of each
thread.
• Interrupt thread. The interrupt thread handles the interrupt messages sent to
Wombat. It has the highest priority among the L4 threads running Wombat. There-
fore when the message is sent, the interrupt thread is dispatched immediately even
if other threads are running. The default L4 priority of the interrupt thread is set
to 100.
After the L4 thread starts its execution, it calls interrupt loop() and get into an
infinite loop. First it blocks to wait for an interrupt message. When it receives
a message, calls a corresponding interrupt handler and blocks again to wait for
another message. Before it blocks, it calls need resched() to check if rescheduling
is necessary or not. If a task switch is going to be performed, it sends a message to
the system call thread. Timer interrupt messages are sent from the timer server to
the interrupt thread every 10 ms.
• System call thread. The system call thread handles system calls invoked by
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Linux processes. Generally, system calls are implemented with software interrupt
instruction. When a software interrupt is performed in a process, L4 traps and
translate it to an IPC to the parent thread, which is a system call thread. When it
finishes processing a system call, it sends a message back to the process and blocks
again to wait for the next IPC. It is assigned L4 priority 99.
All system calls are handled by a single system call thread. To switch the context
inside the Wombat kernel, the thread invokes arch switch(), which switches stacks
and registers without trapping into L4. A corresponding process thread will be kept
in block state until it is dispatched again.
When the quantum of a process is expired, a rescheduling message is sent to system
call thread from interrupt thread. System call thread changes the state of corre-
sponding process thread to stop state and switches to another kernel context by
invoking arch switch().
• Process thread. Process thread is a thread generated one for each Linux processes.
Each Linux process has its own address space. All of them run in L4 priority 98.
When it performs a system call, it block in block state till the reply IPC is sent.
When the quantum is expired, the state of itself is changed by the system call thread
to stop state. In this way, only one thread runs at a time.
3.2.3 L4/TOPPERS
L4/TOPPERS is a para-virtualized TOPPERS based on the porting done by Oikawa et al.
In this section, we introduce the implementation of L4/TOPPERS and some extensions
we made to support task grain scheduling.
Figure 3.3: L4/TOPPERS
L4/TOPPERS consists of the main thread and some interrupt threads (Figure 3.3).
All the threads run in a single address space. The main thread executes all the tasks. Here
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we describe how we para-virtualized interrupt handling and interrupt locking mechanism
in our system.
• Interrupt virtualization. Hardware interrupts are sent to interrupt threads, which
they are created for interrupt source one each. All of them have a same priority.
Timer interrupts are sent from the timer server.
When an interrupt thread starts executing, it associates itself to a specific interrupt
source calling L4 API, gets in an infinite loop, and blocks to wait for an interrupt
message. When an interrupt message is sent to the associated thread, it disabled
interrupts and invokes an original L4/TOPPERS interrupt handler. When a new
thread is activated, the interrupt thread changes the pc register and the sp register.
of the main thread and let it switch to a new task.
• Interrupt lock. Original TOPPERS executes specific processor instructions to
enable and disable interrupts. Since these instructions are privileged instruction,
they cannot be executed by user-level applications. Therefore in L4/TOPPERS
the interrupt disabling function should be implemented as locking and unlocking a
common variable shared by threads.
• Idle state. When there is no active thread, the main thread invokes l4 idle()
which blocks to wait for an IPC message. Since there is no active threads in
L4/TOPPERS in this state, other a thread in another OS can be executed. The
main thread is resumed by sending IPC from interrupt threads.
3.3 Task Grain Scheduling
In this section, we introduce the basic design of the task grain scheduling in hypervisor.
Task grain scheduling enables assigning a higher priority to a task in the GPOS running
concurrently beside the RTOS on top of an embedded system hypervisor.
3.3.1 Full- and Para-virtualization
There are several diﬀerent types of virtualization. One classification is full-virtualization
and para-virtualization. A hypervisor supporting full-virtualization provides an interface
identical to existing hardwares, so guest OSes could be run in it without any modification.
The hypervisor with the task grain scheduling needs to acquire the information of guest
OSes. To acquire the information in full-virtualization model, the hypervisor should know
the binary layout of guest OSes and somehow trap some events such as task switches and
priority changes. Since this introduce a great overhead to the hypervisor, full-virtualization
is not suitable for implementing the task grain scheduling.
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Figure 3.4: Mapping the local priorities to the global priority
In contrast, para-virtualization allows modifying guest OS source codes, so some
hooks could be inserted into guest OSes to acquire information. The term para-virtualization
was introduced in [65], and the basic idea already existed in early 1970s mentioned
by Goldberg[26, 27]. In this chapter we consider only a hypervisor leveraging a para-
virtualization technique.
3.3.2 Scheduling Algorithm
The task grained scheduling targets a hypervisor and OSes supporting fixed priority pre-
emptive scheduling, since it is generally supported by major RTOSes and also GPOSes to
provide real-time tasks.
3.3.3 Global Priority
Each OS has diﬀerent scale of scheduling priority. Generally they are represented as
integer numbers, but the value range (maximum and minimum) and the order (ascending,
descending) diﬀer. Therefore the priority of tasks running in diﬀerent OS cannot be simply
compared using their priority numbers. In our scheme we provide a global priority. By
mapping the priority of each OS to the global priority as shown in Figure 3.4, tasks could
be prioritized in a single common scale.
The priority of tasks running in diﬀerent guest OS completely depends to a system
configuration, so it is worthless to automate the priority mapping. The mapping should
be done manually by developers during the design stage of the system. The mapping of
priority numbers can be any kind of method, a simple addition or subtraction, giving a
detailed mapping table, etc.
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Figure 3.5: Global scheduler
3.3.4 Global Scheduler
The global scheduler, which resides in a hypervisor selects OS running a task that has the
highest global priority. A guest OS tells the priority of a currently running task on it to
the global scheduler when tasks switches (Figure 3.5). With the fixed priority preemptive
scheduling, the task switch occurs in following timings.
• The state of a task changes from running to block
• The state of a task changes from block to running
• A task is created
• A task is deleted
• The priority of a task is changed
In other words, this mechanism is a double layered scheduling. The guest scheduling
is performed as it originally does, and the global scheduler performs the scheduling when
the priority change is notified by guest OSes.
3.3.5 Task Grained Scheduling in L4-embedded
In our prototype, the L4 priority is used as the global priority. The L4 priority is repre-
sented as 0 to 255 ascending (the larger is the prior) integer numbers. This range is bigger
enough than the Linux and the TOPPERS priority range. Also, the L4 scheduler is used
as the global scheduler. When a task is switched in a guest OS and the priority of currently
running task changes, it modifies the priority of the thread by calling L4 Set Priority()
and the L4 scheduler is invoked by calling L4 Yield().
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3.3.6 Task Grained Scheduling in Wombat
Linux supports two diﬀerent types of scheduling algorithms, dynamic priority scheduling
and fixed priority scheduling. This time, we map Linux fixed priority to the global priority.
Note that the dynamic priority scheduling is done referring to the process nice value which
is widely used in POSIX systems, but fixed priority has nothing to do with nice. In default
Wombat, the priority of threads running Linux processes are always 98 in the L4 priority,
regardless of the fixed priority set to the process. The fixed priority of Linux is represented
as 0 to 99 ascending (the larger is the prior) integer. We calculate the global priority using
following formulas. GWP (p) represents the global priority of a Wombat process p. PW (p)
represents the Linux fixed priority of a Wombat process p. It is written as p->rt priority
in the Linux source code, in which p is a task struct structure pointer for a corresponding
process. CW represents the minimum global priority that can be set by Wombat.
GWP (p) = PW (p) + CW
GWS (p) represents the global priority of a system call thread associated with the
kernel context of a process p. The global priority of the system call thread changes
dynamically with which process is running in Wombat.
GWS (p) = PW (p) + CW + 1 = GWP (p) + 1
GWI represents the priority of the interrupt thread. It should have higher priority
than the other Wombat threads. max(x) represents the maximum value that x could be.
GWI > max(GWS (p)) = max(PW (p)) + CW + 1 > GWP (p)
3.3.7 Task Grained Scheduling in L4/TOPPERS
L4/TOPPERS notifies a priority to the global scheduler in following functions.
• dispatch r() is a function invoked when a task is dispatched. A task switch involves
priority change, so priority is notified to the global scheduler.
• l4 dispatch r() is a function invoked when a task is resuming from preemption. It
involves priority change as well as dispatch r(), so the priority of resuming thread
is notified to the global scheduler.
• check resched() is a function invoked by an interrupt handler to check if there is
a pending task switch. If a new task is going to be activated, the priority of the new
task is notified to the global scheduler.
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Table 3.1: Evaluation settings
Wombat L4/TOPPERS
Min/max priority CW = 93 CT = 110
Interrupt thread priority GWI = 100 GTI = 120
The priority of L4/TOPPERS is represented as 1 to 16 descending (the smaller is
the prior) integer. T (t) represents the TOPPERS priority of a task t. GT (t) represents
the global priority of a task t. It is written as t->priority in the TOPPERS source
code, in which t is a task control block structure pointer for a corresponding task. CT
represents the maximum global priority that can be set by L4/TOPPERS.
GT (t) = CT − T (t)
GTI represents the priority of interrupt threads. It should be greater than the other
TOPPERS threads.
GTI ≥ CT
CT > max(GT (t)) = CT − 1
3.4 Evaluation
We made evaluation with the prototype system in Section 3.2. The machine we used is
DELL Precision 390; Intel Core2 Duo E6600 2.4GHz CPU, 2GB Memory and ATA133
512GB HDD. Core2 Duo is a dual core processor, but we used only one of the cores. To
acquire the time we leveraged the rdtsc instruction which gives a time stamp which has
an resolution of CPU ticks. We divide it with the frequency of the CPU and show them
in microseconds (µs) or milliseconds (ms).
In the evaluation, CW (the minimum global priority of the Wombat tasks), GWI
(the global priority of the Wombat interrupt thread), CT (the maximum global priority
of the L4/TOPPERS tasks) and GTI (the global priority of the L4/TOPPERS interrupt
threads) are set as shown in Table 3.1. CW is 93 so it may expire GWI , but since the
prototype system use only the Linux fixed priority from 0 to 5, it does not corrupt the
scheduling.
Section 3.4.1 discusses about the context switch overheads. We evaluate direct and
indirect interrupt delay as the basic overheads in Section 3.4.2. In Section 3.4.3, we run a
dummy task set to try prioritizing tasks running in two diﬀerent guest OSes. Section 3.4.4
evaluates the eﬀect of frequent disk access performed in Wombat to a cyclic task running
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in L4/TOPPERS.
3.4.1 Context Switch Overhead
In case of L4/TOPPERS without the task grain scheduling, the basic context switch over-
head is equivalent to original native TOPPERS. However since interrupts are interposed
by L4, the task switch triggered by an interrupt would take longer time than native TOP-
PERS. The overhead of the interrupt handling is shown in Section 3.4.2. Also, the context
switch overhead of Wombat is described in [40] in detail.
When the task grain scheduling is enabled, system calls are invoked at every task
switch to notify the priority of running task to the L4 scheduler. Therefore the time of an
L4 system call is added to task switch overheads, for both L4/TOPPERS and Wombat.
3.4.2 Interrupt Delay Overhead
The interrupt handling delay is increased when an OS is virtualized, because the inter-
rupt is interposed by the underlying hypervisor. In this section, we measured and com-
pared the delay of invoking interrupt handler for original TOPPERS (Figure 3.6 (a)) and
L4/TOPPERS (Figure 3.6 (b)). We set measuring points at followings.
Figure 3.6: Serial interrupt delays
• TOPPERS
– The entry point of serial interrupt
– The beginning of serial handler
– The beginning of a task waiting for serial input
• L4/TOPPERS
– The entry point of serial interrupt in L4
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– The beginning of the serial handler
– The beginning of a task waiting for serial input
The average of the delays are shown in Table 3.3. The overhead is 3.46µs. The
processing time between the entry point and the handler increases because of the virtual-
ization. The increased overhead between the handler and the application is because the
interrupt enabling and disabling instructions are replaced by alternative functions.
Table 3.2: Average interrupt delay: in microseconds (cycles)
TOPPERS/JSP L4/TOPPERS
1. Entry point - Handler 0.05 ( 124) 2.45 (5867)
2. Handler - Task 11.54 (27623) 12.60 (30178)
Total 11.59 (27747) 15.05 (36045)
Table 3.3: Worst interrupt delay: in microseconds (cycles)
TOPPERS/JSP L4/TOPPERS
1. Entry point - Handler 0.07 ( 171) 11.39 (27270)
2. Handler - Task 19.28 (46170) 13.95 (33390)
Total 19.35 (27747) 25.34 (60660)
We measured the overhead of interrupt handling with a device server (Figure 3.7
(b)), compare it with the direct interrupt handling (Figure 3.7 (a)).
Figure 3.7: Direct and indirect interrupt delays
The delay of passing an interrupt message to an user-level thread is almost same
for indirect and direct (Table 3.4). The IPC passing from timer server to TOPPERS takes
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9.18µs. Therefore the overhead of passing an interrupt message through a device server is
8.98µs.
Table 3.4: Average indirect timer interrupt delay: in microseconds
Direct Indirect
Entry point - Thread 2.33 2.25
Timer server - Handler (Indirect) - 9.18
Interrupt thread - Handler (Direct) 0.12 -
Total 2.45 11.43
The measurements show that the delay of handling interrupts directly is increased
3.45µs (8298 cycles) because of the para-virtualization, and the overhead of handling
interrupt through device server is 8.98µs. Comparing these values with the original TOP-
PERS, the delays are increased 30% and 90%. Whether this overhead is acceptable in
constructing a system, depends on the requirement of a task set in the system. Note that
the overhead is rather small comparing to the jitters in the Linux kernel. If this overhead
is not negligible, one way to decrease it is to use a processor which has a higher frequency.
Another way is to redesign the system not to share an interrupt source, or make the OS
itself a device server.
3.4.3 Task Grain Scheduling
We observed the behavior of the task grain scheduling applying it to tasks shown in Table
3.5. This evaluation is done in DELL Precision 390, the machine described in detail at
the top of this Section 5. Without the task grain scheduling, scheduling by the hypervisor
is done in an unit of OSes (Figure 3.8 (a)), and with it done in an unit of tasks (Figure
3.8 (b)).
Task 1 and 3 are TOPPERS tasks which is activated in cycles shown in the table.
Every time it is activated, it executes an empty loop for the execution time shown in the
table.
Task 2 is a real-time process running in Wombat. It executes an empty loop for 12ms.
We measured the time that tasks are activated and stopped without and with the
task grained scheduling. The result is in Figure 3.9. To meet the deadline of Task 1, high
priority is set to L4/TOPPERS. Therefore Task 1 gets a higher priority than Task 2, so
the Task 2 is preempted when Task 1 is active. Thereby Task 2 misses its deadline as
shown in Figure 3.9 (a).
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Figure 3.8: Dummy tasks without and with task grain scheduling
Table 3.5: Dummy tasks
OS Cycle Execution time L4 priority Global priority
(w/o TGS) (w/ TGS)
Task 1 L4/TOPPERS 60ms 20ms 110 (High) 95 (Low)
Task 2 Wombat 30ms 12ms 98 (Low) 96 (Middle)
Task 3 L4/TOPPERS 2ms 100µs 110 (High) 105 (High)
Figure 3.9 (b) shows the measurement with task grain scheduling. Task 2 is assigned
a higher global priority than Task 1, so Task 2 is not preempted by Task 1. In this way,
all the tasks meet their deadlines.
If we give following assumptions to the task set in Table 3.5, rate monotonic
scheduling[39] can be applied.
• The tasks do not have any shared resources
• Deadlines are equal to cycles
• No overhead in task switch
The sum of CPU usage is,
0.1/2 + 10/30 + 20/60 = 0.71666...
Using the formula of rate-monotonic scheduling,
U = 3( 3
√
2− 1) = 0.77976...
0.71666... < 0.77976
So these tasks can be guaranteed not to miss their deadlines.
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Figure 3.9: Testing task grain scheduling
Since rate-monotonic scheduling has strict constraints, they are diﬃcult to use in
practical systems. However we believe the task grain scheduling increased the flexibility of
priority setting in hypervisor-based system. If they try to overcome these problem without
leveraging the task grained scheduling, task should be ported to another OS or task should
be split to multiple tasks which both take big engineering costs.
3.4.4 Interrupt Delay Jitters
We measured the jitters introduced to the interrupt delay of para-virtualized TOPPERS.
In the experiment, we run L4/TOPPERS and Wombat concurrently to see the eﬀect
of activities within Wombat. In this setup, all the tasks on L4/TOPPERS have higher
priority than those on Wombat, which does not use the task grain scheduling. Critical
sections in L4 could delay the dispatch of interrupt threads. When the API invocation
in Wombat and the interrupt associated to L4 occurs in a same time, the dispatch of the
L4/TOPPERS thread can be delayed.
We measured the intervals of L4/TOPPERS’s periodic task which runs every 2ms,
with running Wombat heavily loaded with a program accessing a HDD. We compare the
cycle of the task with running them with the The y-axis shows the interval time from
the previous dispatch time to the dispatch time of a cyclic task. The x-axis shows the
iteration, how many times the cyclic task is dispatched. The worst case experienced 19µs
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(44198 cycles) additional delay over the average interval of 2017µs (4829941 cycles).
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Figure 3.10: The intervals of TOPPERS’s 2ms periodic task.
3.5 Related Work
In this section, we classify related work into three diﬀerent groups, and compare with our
approach.
3.5.1 Improving OS Real-time Performance
There are some eﬀorts made to modify an existing GPOS to support real-time scheduling.
As we mentioned in Section 3.1, Molnar developed the Linux real-time preemption patch
[45] which enables Linux to preemption processes in the kernel area. Ishiwata et al.
extended the Linux kernel to support hard real-time tasks by replacing spin locks with
mutex locks that support the priority inheritance [35, 36]. Some commodity products are
also supporting extension to satisfy short response time required by embedded systems,
such as MontaVista Linux [46].
In this approach, the task scheduling could be done in a unit of tasks (or process,
in POSIX systems). However supporting both real-time and high throughput are con-
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tradicting concept. Supporting both of them at a time entails a complex system design,
implementation and great engineering cost. Furthermore comparing to the hypervisor-
based systems, applications for diﬀerent OSes should be ported, or black box applications
for other OSes can not be used.
3.5.2 Hybrid Architecture
RTLinux [24], RTAI [44] are real-time extended Linux implementation, which are inter-
polating a microkernel between the Linux kernel and the underlying hardware to achieve
the short interrupt response time and guaranteed real-time scheduling. RTLinux is replac-
ing a part of Linux’s hardware abstraction layer by their own real-time microkernel. In
contrast, RTAI is implemented as Linux modules and giving minimal modification to the
Linux kernel, though their basic ideas are the same. In this model, Linux processes never
aﬀect the behavior of the microkernel and its tasks, since the interrupt disabling instruc-
tions are removed from the Linux kernel and it only can disable the interrupt virtually.
All the interrupts are first send to the microkernel and then to the Linux kernel. In this
case, the priority of the Linux processes are always the lowest.
Linux on ITRON is Linux running as a task of the ITRON real-time OS[59]. The
architecture of Linux on ITRON is similar to the technique taken by RTLinux and RTAI.
The major diﬀerence is that Linux on ITRON is using an existing RTOS based on µITRON
specification as its interpolation layer. This gives an additional advantage of reusing
existing applications compatible with µITRON specification. Some discussions about the
coarse grain scheduling of real-time tasks were discussed in the paper, but they have not
implemented fine grained scheduling in their system.
Comparing to the hypervisor-based approach, hybrid architecture lacks flexibility
to select an RTOS. RTLinux and RTAI provides its own API to real-time processes, which
are not compatible with existing APIs. Linux on ITRON provides the µITRON API to
real-time processes, but no choice to use other RTOS APIs.
3.5.3 Hypervisor-based Systems
A hypervisor is a system level software which enables multiple OSes to share hardwares,
such as a processor, memory, and sometimes other peripheral devices. Each guest OSes
runs in an isolated address space, so the fault of an OS does not aﬀect other OSes. This
characteristic is anticipated to make embedded systems more robust.
When the hypervisor itself supports real-time scheduling, it could be potentially
used as a platform for running real-time applications. This is mentioned by David Golub
et al. in the paper introducing an Unix server on the Mach microkernel[28]. Also, some
eﬀorts were made to make Mach real-time[47].
Xen[16] is a hypervisor developed for servers and desktops. It supports both para-
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virtualization and full-virtualization. With para-virtualization, it can run modified Linux
(XenoLinux) as its guest OS. Applications can run on XenoLinux without any modifica-
tions. Both full virtualization and para-virtualization is supported. A group in Samsung
has experimentally ported Xen to the embedded ARM architecture, whose purpose was
to enhance the security of devices [34]. The experiment does not discuss on interrupt
lantencies. The scheduling of Xen aims to sustain system throughput, but not real-time
responsiveness. The main scheduling algorithm is BVT[23] which sets a weight to each
OS as a parameter. The processor usage of each OS get close to the ratio of weight after
running for awhile. In this chapter we target embedded systems which require real-time
scheduling. Achieving guaranteed real-time scheduling and high system throughput are
contradicting concept.
L4Linux is a Linux kernel implemented on top of the L4Ka microkernel as a
server[29]. Some additional work has been done for integrating real-time applications
and L4Linux on top of L4Ka[30]. The purpose of this research was not scheduling gran-
ularity but good performance isolation. They ‘tamed’ Linux not to aﬀect real-time tasks
running beside it on top of L4Ka.
Oikawa et al. ported the TOPPERS/JSP kernel 3 [60] (TOPPERS for short) to the
TL4 microkernel (TL4 for short) which is a modified L4Ka::Hazelnut kernel[58]. In other
words, they built a TOPPERS interface on top of L4. TL4 has a capability to run multiple
instances of TOPPERS. Each of them runs in an isolated memory space provided by TL4.
Therefore, the entire TOPPERS kernel and its applications can be directly reused. They
measured the delay of interrupt handling and task dispatch. The results show that the
overhead is small and delay is close to the original TOPPERS. This research shows that
the overhead of virtualization can be reasonable value.
Iguana is a real-time embedded platform constructed on the L4-embedded micro-
kernel. In parallel, para-virtualized Linux, called Wombat, is developed on top of Iguana.
Iguana was developed to facilitate the programming in the L4-embedded based system
since L4-embedded supports only primitive mechanisms. Our work is using Iguana and
Wombat as its platform. We ported the work of Oikawa et al. to the Iguana platform,
and let TOPPERS run on L4-embedded beside Wombat.
Today, products such as VLX [8] and VMware Mobile [17] are available. The L4-
embedded project is now branched to the OKL4 project [4].
3.6 Summary
In this chapter we introduced our experience on developing a multi-OS architecture for
embedded system that hosts a RTOS and a GPOS. We evaluated the real-time respon-
siveness of our implementation on the real-world machine. The result shows that the
3TOPPERS/JSP is an embedded RTOS compatible with µITRON specification
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hypervisor introduced large interrupt delay overhead into the interrupt response time of
the RTOS. In addition the interrupt source shared between the OSes entailed jitters into
the cycles of the periodic task. This is the limitation of the architecture which requires
sharing an interrupt source between guest kernels.
We also developed the task grain scheduling on our implementation, which give
flexibility of assigning a priority higher than tasks on the RTOS to tasks on the GPOS.
Adopting the method we succeeded to let the experimental task set to fulfill the require-
ment of applying the rate-monotonic scheduling to meet the deadline.
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Chapter 4
Software-based Processor Core
Multiplexing
Despite the strong requirement of supporting deterministic real-time scheduling on vir-
tualization based multi-OS embedded systems, which enables co-location of a RTOS and
a GPOS on a single device, there are few investigations in real-world hardware. In this
chapter we introduce our virtualization layer SPUMONE, which runs on single-core and
multicore SH-4A processors which introduces low overhead and requires small engineering
eﬀort to modify guest OS kernels. SPUMONE now can execute the TOPPERS RTOS and
Linux as a GPOS concurrently on a single embedded test platform. In addition we propose
two methodologies to mitigate the interference of Linux to the real-time responsiveness of
the RTOS. One leverages the interrupt priority level mechanism supported by the SH-4A
processor. The other is the proactive migration of virtual core among physical cores to
prevent the Linux kernel activity from blocking the interrupts assigned to the RTOS. The
evaluation shows our methodologies can decrease the interrupt delay of the RTOS entailed
by Linux. In addition, sharing a core between the RTOS and Linux will increase total
processor utilization when executing some specific applications.
4.1 Background
Modern embedded systems like cell-phones and digital home appliances are rapidly ex-
panding their functionality, getting competitive with desktop systems. However there are
some embedded system specific requirements for real-time control processing, which is
diﬃcult to be supported by a GPOS.
Therefore, constructing an embedded device with a real-time and a GPOS has
attracted attention as an approach to let embedded device balance real-time responsive-
ness and rich functionalities. There are various approaches to achieve this. One of the
approaches is to use a multi-core SoC typically equipped with two processors, one for a
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RTOS and the other for a GPOS. Another approach is the hybrid system[66, 44, 59] which
executes a general purpose OS as a task of a real-time OS.
In this chapter we focus on virtualization technologies, originally widely used in
enterprise servers and desktop computers. Now, embedded systems are attracting atten-
tion as a new research field of virtualization technologies [31]. Embedded systems require
diﬀerent characteristics and gives some new challenges those have not been discussed on
the previous application fields of virtualization technologies. According to the discussion
in [14], the requirements to embedded system hardware virtualization are;
• minimal or no modification to OS kernels and their applications
• let OSes to reuse their native device drivers
• support real-time responsiveness in order to maintain the real-time property of RTOS
Hypervisors for enterprise servers and desktop systems, like VMware and Xen, do
not fulfill these requirements. Especially the third requirement is diﬃcult to be supported
by functional hypervisors. Because virtual memory virtualization and I/O virtualization
require complex manipulation of data structures inside hypervisors, they require to syn-
chronize the data structures, and make the hypervisor complex. Therefore, we need to
develop a virtualization layer specialized for embedded systems which is not based on
the methodology of traditional pure-hypervisors that run in the most privileged level and
isolate virtual machines.
We developed a virtualization layer on top of a real-world embedded device and
evaluated its real-time responsiveness. There are three contributions introduced in this
chapter.
• The first one is an OS consolidation methodology which fits the requirements of em-
bedded systems. The evaluation shows that basic overhead and engineering required
to the guest OSes are significantly small compared with related work.
• The second contribution of this chapter is an investigation on the real-time properties
of virtualization technology on real-world devices.
• The third contribution is our proposal of two methodologies for decreasing the over-
head introduced to the RTOS. One is a methodology that leverages interrupt prior-
ity level (IPL) mechanism to enable RTOS to preempt GPOS’s critical section. The
other is to migrate virtual cores among physical cores, when they enter a critical
section, in order to prevent GPOS kernel activities to block the execution of RTOS.
We developed a thin virtualization layer called SPUMONE which enables the co-
execution of multiple OSes on single-core processor and multi-core processor equipped
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Figure 4.1: SPUMONE based sys-
tem on a single-core processor
Figure 4.2: SPUMONE based system on a
multi-core processor
with SH-4A architecture cores. SPUMONE can co-execute the TOPPERS RTOS 1 and
Linux. The evaluation shows that our approach achieves suﬃcient real-time responsiveness
for both methodologies. However, virtual core migration introduces a large overhead
depending on the property of application executed on top of SMP Linux, which decreases
the performance of GPOS applications.
4.2 Design and Implementation
This section introduces our methodology for accommodating multiple OSes on top of a
single embedded device. The methodology is based on a thin virtualization layer called
SPUMONE and some modifications to OS kernels.
4.2.1 SPUMONE
SPUMONE (Software Processing Unit, Multiplexing ONE into two or more) is a thin soft-
ware layer for multiplexing a single physical processor into multiple virtual ones. In other
words, SPUMONE provides a virtual multicore processor interface on top of a physical
single-core processor. Unlike typical hypervisors or virtual machine monitors, SPUMONE
itself and OS kernels are executed in privileged mode as shown in Fig.4.1, in order to
simplify the system design and to eliminate the overhead of cross domain calls between
user and kernel mode for system-calls and hypercalls. If an OS does not leverage privilege
levels, its applications will be executed in kernel mode altogether.
Executing the virtualization layer and the kernels in the kernel mode contributes to
minimize the overhead introduced to and the amount of modifications required to the OS
kernels. Furthermore it makes the implementation of SPUMONE itself simple. Executing
1TOPPERS is a RTOS which meets µITRON RTOS specification widely used in Japanese industry
http://www.ertl.jp/ITRON/
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OS kernels in user mode is known to complicate the implementation of the abstraction
layer, because various privileged instructions need to be emulated.
In SPUMONE based system, the majority of the kernel and application instruc-
tions, including the privileged instructions, are executed directly by the real processor,
and only a minimal set of instructions are emulated by SPUMONE. These emulated in-
structions are invoked from the OS kernels using a simple function call. Since the interface
has no binary compatibility with the original processor interface, we simply modify the
source code of OS kernels, a method known as the para-virtualization Thus we assume we
have access to the source code of the OS kernels. The modifications required to the OS
kernels are described in details in Sec.4.2.2.
SPUMONE for multicore processors is designed in a distributed model: a dedicated
instance of SPUMONE is assigned to each physical core as shown in Fig.4.2. This design is
chosen in order to eliminate the unpredictable overhead of synchronization among multiple
processor cores. In addition, the basic lock mechanism can be shared between single-core
and multicore version, which may the simplify the design of SPUMONE. It also enables
the system to scale on multicore and many-core processors as discussed in [18].
• Interrupt/Trap Delivery Interrupt virtualization is a key feature of SPUMONE.
Interrupts are investigated by SPUMONE before they are delivered to each OS.
SPUMONE receives an interrupt, then looks up the interrupt destination table to
make a decision to which OS it should be sent. The destination virtual processor is
statically defined for each interrupt when the kernels are built. Traps are also sent
to SPUMONE first, then are directly forwarded to the currently executing OS.
To let SPUMONE receive interrupts before the OSes, we modified the interrupt entry
point of the OS kernels to SPUMONE’s vector table. The entry point of each OS is
notified to SPUMONE via a virtual instruction for registering their vector table. An
interrupt is first handled by SPUMONE’s interrupt handler in which the destination
virtual processor is decided and the corresponding scheduler is invoked. When the
interrupt triggers an OS switch, all the registers of the current OS are saved into
the register stack, then the register stack for the other OS is loaded. Finally the
execution branches into the entry point of the destination OS. The processor registers
are setup just as the real interrupt occurred, so the code of the OS entry points does
not need to be modified.
The interrupt delivery process on multicore platform works basically as same as the
one on single-core platform. Each SPUMONE instance delivers interrupts to their
destinations. On multicore system, virtual cores may migrate among cores. In order
to deliver interrupts to a virtual core running on a diﬀerent core, the assignments of
interrupts and physical cores are switched along with virtual core migrations.
• Virtual Processor Scheduling A processor is multiplexed by scheduling the exe-
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cution of OSes. The execution states of the OSes are managed by a data structure
that we call a virtual processor or a virtual core. When switching the execution of
the virtual processors, all the hardware registers are stored into the corresponding
virtual processor’s register table, and then loaded from the table of the next ex-
ecuting virtual processor. The mechanism is similar to the process paradigm of a
classical OS, however the virtual processor saves the entire processor state, including
the privileged control registers.
The scheduling algorithm of virtual processors is a fixed priority preemptive schedul-
ing. When the RTOS and the GPOS share a core, the virtual processor bound to the
RTOS would gain a higher priority than the virtual processor bound to the GPOS
in order to maintain the real-time responsiveness. This means the GPOS is executed
only when the virtual processor for the RTOS is in an idle state and has no task to
execute. The process or task scheduling is left up to OS so the scheduling model for
each OS is maintained as-is. The idle RTOS resumes its execution when it receives
an interrupt. The interrupt for RTOS preempts the GPOS immediately, even if the
GPOS is disabling interrupts. When virtual cores assigned to GPOS are migrated
to execute on a shared core, those cores are scheduled with timesharing scheduler.
• Inter-core Communication Communications among SPUMONE instances run-
ning on their physical cores are implemented with shared memory area and inter-core
interrupt (ICI). First, sender stores data on specific memory area, then sends an in-
terrupt to the destination, and receiver loads data. Or receiver may also wait for
sender by polling on data.
4.2.2 Modifying OS Kernels
Each OS is modified to be aware of the existence of the other OS, because hardware
resources other than the processor are not multiplexed by SPUMONE. Thus those are
exclusively assigned to each OS by reconfiguring or by modifying their kernels. The
following describes the points of the OS kernels to be modified in order to run on top of
SPUMONE. Table 4.1 lists the modified source code of Linux.
• Interrupt Vector Table Register Instruction. The instruction registering the
address of a vector table is replaced to notify the address to SPUMONE’s interrupt
manager. Typically this instruction is invoked once during the OS initialization.
• Bootstrap. In addition to the features supported by the single-core SPUMONE,
the multi-core version provides virtual reset vector device, which is responsible for
resetting the program counter of the virtual core those resides on a diﬀerent core.
• Physical Memory A fixed physical memory area is assigned to each OS. The
physical address for the OSes can be simply changed by modifying the configuration
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file or their source code. Virtualizing the physical memory would impose a large
code into the virtualization layer and substantial performance overhead. In addition,
unlike the hypervisor for enterprise systems, embedded systems have a fixed number
of OSes. For these reasons we assigned fixed physical memory area for each OS.
• Idle Instruction On a real processor, the idle instruction suspends a processor
till it receives an interrupt. On a virtualized environment, this is used to yield the
use of real processor to another OS. We prevent the execution of this instruction by
replacing it with the SPUMONE API. Typically this instruction is embedded in a
specific part of kernel, which is fairly easy to find.
• Peripheral Devices Peripheral devices are assigned by SPUMONE to each OS
exclusively. This is done by modifying the configuration of each OS not to share the
same peripherals. We assume that most of devices can be assigned exclusively to
each OS. This assumption is reasonable because embedded system multi-OS plat-
forms have asymmetric OS combinations unlike a symmetric multi-OS platform for
enterprise systems. It consists of diﬀerent kinds of OSes, usually a RTOS and a
GPOS. For instance, a RTOS is used for controlling specific peripherals such as a
radio transmitter and some digital signal processors, and a GPOS for controlling a
display and buttons.
However some devices cannot be assigned exclusively to each OS because both sys-
tems need to use them. For instance, only one interrupt controller is provided by the
experimental processor we used. Usually the OS clears some of its registers during
its initialization. In the case of running on SPUMONE, the OS booting after the
first one should be careful not to clear or overwrite the settings of the OS executed
first. We modified the Linux initialization code to preserve the settings done by
TOPPERS.
• Reset Vectors
SPUMONE also runs on multi-core processors. The design of multi-core SPUMONE
is basically the same as the single-core version. Each core is managed by a dedicated
SPUMONE instance. Interrupts are handled by the instance bound to each core,
then forwarded to the OS. Each instance communicates using inter-core interrupt
(ICI) and shared memory area. The original processor mechanism of resetting a core
is replaced with SPUMONE’s function.
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Table 4.1: A list of the modifications to the Linux kernel
File Function/Variable Description
.config CONFIG MEMORY START Modified to use the upper half
(64MB) of the main memoryCONFIG MEMORY SIZE
setup.c sh2007 setup(char **cmdline p) Modified not to overwrite the
value in the interrupt controller
register set by TOPPERS
setup-sh7780.c intc2 irq table The interrupt source table.
Removed one of the serial devices
which is used by TOPPERS
head.S Flag register initial value Modified IPL, not to block the
interrupts for TOPPERS
traps.c per cpu trap init(void) Replaced the vector table register
instruction with SPUMONE API
irqflags.h raw local irq disable(void) Modified not to mask the
interrupts assigned to TOPPERSraw local irq disable(void)
raw local irq restore(void)
processor.h cpu sleep() Replaced the idle instruction with
the SPUMONE API
4.3 Interrupt Delay Reduction
4.3.1 Interrupt Priority Level Assignment
In order to contain interrupt delay of a RTOS in reasonable value independent of the
activity of a GPOS running concurrently on a single device, we propose two methodologies.
First is replacing the interrupt enable and disable instructions with the virtual instruction
interface. A typical OS disables all interrupt sources when disabling interrupts for atomic
execution. By contrast, our approach leverages the interrupt mechanism of the processor:
we assign the higher half of the interrupt priority levels (IPLs) to the RTOS and the lower
half to the GPOS (Fig.4.4). When the GPOS tries to block the interrupts, it modifies its
interrupt mask to the middle priority. The RTOS may therefore preempt the GPOS even
if it is disabling the interrupts (Fig.4.3 (1)). On the other hand when the RTOS is running,
the interrupts are blocked by the processor (Fig.4.3 (2)). These blocked interrupts could
be sent immediately when the GPOS is dispatched.
The instructions enabling and disabling interrupts are typically provided as kernel
internal APIs. They are typically coded as inline functions or macros in the kernel source
code. For the GPOS, we replace those APIs with the instructions enabling the entire level
of interrupts and disabling only low priorities interrupts. For the RTOS, we replace those
APIs with the instructions enabling only high priority interrupts and disabling the entire
level of interrupts. Therefore, interrupts assigned to the RTOS are immediately delivered
to the RTOS, and the interrupts assigned to the GPOS are blocked during the RTOS
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Figure 4.3: Interrupt Delivery Mechanism
execution. Figure 4.4 shows the interrupt priority levels assignment for each OS, which
we used in the evaluation environment.
Figure 4.4: The interrupt priority levels assignment
4.3.2 Virtual Processor Core Migration
Second methodology is based on virtual core migration. As we implemented the IPL
methodology, we found out that some paths of the GPOS kernel gained a highest lock
priority unexpectedly (e.g. bootstrap, idle thread). This suggests us the possibility that
some device drivers or kernel modules programmed in bad manner gains a high IPL and
interfere with the activity of the RTOS. We modified SPUMONE to proactively migrate
virtual core, which is assigned to GPOS sharing a physical core with RTOS, to another
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core when it traps into the kernel or interrupts are triggered. In this way, only the user
level code of the GPOS is executed concurrently on a shared core, which will never obtain
a lock. Therefore, the RTOS may preempt the GPOS immediately without separating
IPLs (Fig.4.5).
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Figure 4.5: Virtual core migration
4.4 Evaluation
We evaluated the basic overhead, the engineering cost of modifying the OS kernels, and
the real-time responsiveness of an RTOS running on SPUMONE. The evaluation for a
single-core system is done on the SH-2007 reference board, with the SH-4A 400 MHz
processor and 128MB memory. The evaluation for a multicore system is done on the
MSRP1BASE02, with a RP1 quad core 600 MHz processor and 128MB memory. We
use TOPPERS/JSP 1.3 as RTOS and Linux 2.6.16 as GPOS for the single-core, and
Linux 2.6.24.3 as GPOS for multi-core. Linux mounts an NFS share exported by the host
machine as its root file system. Basic overhead and engineering cost are both evaluated
on single-core environment.
4.4.1 Basic Overhead
For evaluating the basic overhead of SPUMONE, we measured the overhead of interrupt
handling delay, and the time to build the Linux kernel on top of native (an unmodified
OS running on bare-metal hardware) Linux and modified Linux, respectively.
Table 4.2 shows the average and the worst case CPU cycles required to handle
the interrupts sent to native TOPPERS and modified TOPPERS. In the average case
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SPUMONE imposes 0.67µs overhead to the delay. The worst case overhead shows the
time required to save the state of Linux and restore the state of TOPPERS. The increased
delay is suﬃciently small and predictable for executing real-time applications.
Table 4.2: The delay of handling the timer interrupts in TOPPERS.
Configuration CPU Clocks Time (µs)
native TOPPERS average 102 0.26
(SH) worst 102 0.26
TOPPERS on average 367 0.92
SPUMONE (SH) worst 1582 3.96
native TOPPERS average 124 0.05
(x86) worst 171 0.07
TOPPERS on average 5867 2.45
L4 (x86) worst 27270 11.39
Table 4.3 shows the time required to build Linux kernel on native Linux and mod-
ified Linux executed on top of SPUMONE together with TOPPERS. TOPPERS only
receives the timer interrupts each 1ms, and executes no other tasks. The result shows
that SPUMONE and TOPPERS impose overhead of 1.4% to Linux performance. Note
that the overhead includes the cycles consumed by TOPPERS. The result shows that the
overhead of the virtualization to the system throughput is suﬃciently small.
The average delay of TOPPERS on SPUMONE is 0.25 µs (102 cycles) against the
average delay of TOPPERS on L4 which is 2.45 µs (5867 cycles) shown in Chapter 3.
The result of L4 is measured on the x86 architecture, thus the comparison might not be
fair, however it clearly shows that SPUMONE’s interrupt delay is smaller in the wall clock
time. The result shows the benefit of hosting both the hypervisor and the guests in the
same privileged level: omitting some save/load of the processor registers.
Table 4.3: Linux kernel build time
Configuration Time Overhead
Linux only 68m5.898s -
Linux and TOPPERS 69m3.091s 1.4%
4.4.2 Engineering Cost
We evaluated the engineering cost of reusing the RTOS and the GPOS by comparing the
number of modified lines of code (LoC) in each OS kernel. Table 4.4 shows the LoC added
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and removed from the original Linux kernels. We did not count the lines of device drivers
for inter-kernel communication because the number of lines will diﬀer depending on how
many protocols they support and how complex are them. We did not include the LoC of
utility device drivers provided for communication between Linux and RTOS or Linux and
servers processes because it depends on how many protocols and how complex those are
implemented.
Since we could not find RTLinux, RTAI, OK Linux for the SH-4A processor ar-
chitecture, we evaluated them developed for the Intel architecture. OK Linux is a Linux
kernel virtualized to run on the L4 microkernel. For OK Linux, we only counted the code
added to the architecture dependent directory arch/l4 and include/asm-l4. The com-
parison would not be fair in a precise sense, however as the table shows, it is clear that
our approach requires significantly small modifications to the Linux kernel. This result is
achieved because we are executing OS in kernel mode.
Table 4.4: The total number of modified LoC in *.c, *.S, *.h, Makefiles
OS (Linux version) Added LoC Removed LoC
Linux/SPUMONE (2.6.24.3) 161 8
RTLinux 3.2 (2.6.9) 2798 1131
RTAI 3.6.2 (2.6.19) 5920 163
OK Linux (2.6.24) 28149 -
4.4.3 The Eﬀect of Linux Load to TOPPERS Real-time Responsiveness
We measured the eﬀect of loads on Linux to the dispatch delay of a TOPPERS periodic
task. We compared two methodologies to reduce the interrupt response time interference
by Linux. One is the interrupt priority
A periodic task runs every 1ms. It is sampled 100,000 times during the measure-
ment. The dispatch delay is the time spent from the interrupt trigger till the periodic task
starts its execution. Only the periodic task is executed on TOPPERS which means no
other task on TOPPERS will prevent the execution of it. Figure 4.6 proves that no task
on TOPPERS aﬀects the cycle of the periodic task.
Figure 4.7, 4.8 compares the distribution of the timer interrupt delay without and
with IPL separation (described in Sec. 4.3, Fig. 4.4) under continuous stress on the
processor utilization of Linux. The worst case without the IPL separation marked 17 µs,
with the IPL separation 13 µs; the worst case delay slightly reduced.
Figure 4.9, 4.10 compares the distribution of the timer interrupt delay without and
with IPL separation under continuous write() to a CF card filesystem. We executed
stress as a workload on top of Linux. The measurement with filesystem load shows a
maximum delay of 111µs without the IPL assignment. With the IPL assignment, this
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delay is decreased to 34µs. Comparing this result with the measurement done by [13],
with 1.8GHz Athlon processor which shows maximum delay of a few hundred µs, we can
see that our measurement with 400MHz SH processor achieves fairly small dispatch delay.
Figure 4.11, 4.12 compares the distribution of the timer interrupt delay without
and with virtual core migration under continuous write() to NFS share file system. The
measurement without virtual core migration shows the maximum overhead of 96 µs. With
migration is enabled, the maximum delay is 39 µs.
Figure 4.13, 4.14 compares the distribution of the timer interrupt delay without
and with virtual core migration under frequent IPC load on top of Linux. The IPC load is
generate by hackbench, which is modified to acquire clock cycles from a device file which
returns correct count independent of the processor utilization of the RTOS. The delay
measured without virtual core migration numbered 3770 µs. This is because the interrupt
assigned to the RTOS is blocked by the spinlock mechanism of Linux. With migration
enabled, the interrupt delay is 44 µs.
The overall measurement shows the IPL assignment and the virtual core migration
mitigates the eﬀect of lock disabling performed inside the Linux kernel. Even though this
measurement only shows the statistical maximum interrupt delays, it is clear that they
can reduce the average interrupt delay.
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Figure 4.6: The dispatch delay of 1ms periodic task on native TOPPERS)
42
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
 100000
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140
Sa
m
pl
e 
[nu
m]
Delay [us]
stress -c 32
Figure 4.7: Dispatch delay (CPU stress on Linux without IPL modification)
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Figure 4.8: Dispatch delay (CPU stress on Linux with IPL modification)
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Figure 4.9: Dispatch delay (CF read/write stress on Linux without IPL modification)
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Figure 4.10: Dispatch delay (CF read/write stress on Linux with IPL modification)
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Figure 4.11: Dispatch delay (NFS r/w stress on Linux without virt. core migration)
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Figure 4.12: Dispatch delay (NFS r/w stress on Linux with virt. core migration)
45
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
 100000
 0  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000  3500
Sa
m
pl
e 
[nu
m]
Delay [us]
hackbench w/o vcore migration
Figure 4.13: Dispatch delay on SMP (frequent IPC on Linux without virt. core migration)
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Figure 4.14: Dispatch delay on SMP (frequent IPC on Linux with virt. core migration)
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4.4.4 The Eﬀect of TOPPERS Periodic Task Load to Linux Throughput
We have also measured the eﬀect of the processor utilization of TOPPERS to Linux.
We compared the score of the Dhrystone benchmark and the hackbench benchmark with
Linux running on top of 4 dedicated cores (4 cores in the figure), Linux running on top
of 3 dedicated cores and one core shared with TOPPERS in various work load (xx% in
the figure), and Linux running on top of 3 dedicated cores (3 cores in the figure). The
task on TOPPERS is executed in a cycle of 10 ms. The percentage shows the ratio of the
execution time of periodic task against the cycle (30% means the task is executed for 3
ms continuously).
Figure 4.15 shows the total score of Dhrystone benchmark executed one on each
core. The bar at the left end shows the score of evaluation done with Linux executing by
itself on top of SPUMONE with limited usage of three cores. core 1 and core 2. As long
as the utilization of the periodic task grows, the score of Dhrystone degrades. At load of
90%, the result gets close or less than to three dedicated core configuration. The result
shows the overhead of virtual core migration is kept in reasonable value.
In contrast, Fig.4.16 shows the score of hackbench, a benchmark which evaluates
the scalability of the number of cores. The execution time of hackbench is increased with
the virtual core migration enabled. This is entailed by the frequent system calls invoked
during the benchmark, which triggers virtual core to migrate among physical cores many
times.
From the point of processor utilization, it is better let Linux share a core with
RTOS. Since RTOS processes are usually designed not to consume entire processor time,
in many case there is free processor time that can be consumed by Linux. However the
result of hackbench shows that whether the performance improvement is possible or not
depends on the characteristics of workload running on top of Linux.
The score of hackbench quickly drops along with the increase of load on TOPPERS.
The source of this performance reduction is the phenomenon known as lock holder pre-
emption. Related work has been tackled this phenomenon by giving longer time slice to a
virtual core which is holding a spin lock [55, 64]. Those methodologies cannot be adapted
to our platform because the remaining lock-holder on a processing may cause RTOS dead-
line miss. In addition the application invokes frequent system calls or interrupts, the
overhead of virtual processor migration increases.
4.5 Related Work
Various approaches are proposed to balance real-time responsiveness and rich functionali-
ties on a single platform. One of the approaches is modifying a GPOS to support real-time
responsiveness. The real-time patch is a modification to a plain Linux kernel to support
kernel preemption[45]. It achieves a few hundred µs latency[13], but still the result is
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slower by a factor of ten comparing to typical RTOSes. Even though the mechanism is
potentially capable of achieving real-time responsiveness, it could be easily spoiled by a
bad-mannered device driver, which holds a lock for a long period. Porting software from
an RTOS to Linux would increase the risk of implementing such drivers, because of the
diﬀerence of programming models between the RTOS and Linux or the developers being
unfamiliar with programming on Linux. In addition, porting all the software from the
RTOS to Linux would impose substantial engineering cost.
Another approach, known as the hybrid system, is to link an RTOS with a GPOS.
RTLinux and RTAI replace the Linux hardware abstraction layer with their own version of
RTOSes [66, 44]. Those RTOSes would be executed in kernel mode together with the Linux
kernel. This design is similar to the design of SPUMONE which puts the virtualization
layer and kernels into the same privileged level. The interrupt response time would only
be a few µs, which is comparable to typical RTOSes. However those microkernels only
support their original programming interfaces, which prevents the straight-forward reuse of
48
some real-time software developed for traditional RTOSes. In contrast SPUMONE can run
RTOS kernel with a few hundred LoC of modification to the kernel. Linux on ITRON is an
alternative method to RTLinux and RTAI, which replaces the Linux hardware abstraction
layer with an existing RTOS, µITRON[59]. This architecture enables the system to reuse
both the software developed for Linux and µITRON. The hybrid system provides high
real-time responsiveness comparable with an RTOS with reasonable engineering cost by
reusing existing GPOSes. However considering another combination of an RTOS and a
GPOS would impose redesigning the hybrid system again from scratch. Because it is usual
for manufacturers to leverage diverse OSes, this engineering cost would be problematic.
SPUMONE removes the dependency between the hosted RTOS and GPOS in order to
reduce this cost of adpoting various OSes.
A hypervisor is another technology focusing on accommodating an RTOS and a
GPOS into a single embedded device without modifications or with just minimal modifi-
cations to the OS kernels [31]. A hypervisor provides a virtual hardware interface which
is identical (or almost identical) to some real hardware and isolation between virtualized
guest OSes. A hypervisor supporting full-virtualization exposes a virtual hardware inter-
face identical to a real hardware interface. OSes can be executed without any modification
on full virtualization. However, implementing full virtualization complexifies the design
of the hypervisor itself or requires hardware support for virtualization. Unfortunately
hardware support for virtualization is still an unfamiliar feature for embedded system pro-
cessors. This motivates embedded system hypervisors to use para-virtualization for their
system design, like L4 did. However, the engineering cost required for para-virtualizing
a guest OS kernel is also problematic for manufacturers. In addition, switching privilege
level between a guest OS and a hypervisor will entail performance degradation.
In order to achieve low engineering cost while not penalizing performance, our vir-
tualization layer executes OS kernels and itself in privileged mode. This also contributes to
reduce the engineering cost of modifying OS kernel, because majority of privileged instruc-
tions can be executed by a processor directly and only minimal set of instructions needs
emulation. Furthermore, The virtualization layer multiplexes only minimal hardware re-
sources, while other resources are exclusively assigned to each OS by simply modifying
each OS kernel not to access the same devices.
There are some researches on how to design a scalability OS on multicore and many-
core processors. Corey [20] is an OS which allows applications to explicitly specify the
assignment of data structures among cores. This hints the kernel to schedule processes to
improve cache locality. Multikernel is a experimental OS kernel which exploits multi-core
and many-core processors parallelism by constructing the system with distributed model
[18]. Our basic design is similar to the one of theirs. However our contribution is to let
a composition kernel to reuse software stacks developed on top of existing OSes while
retrieving real-time responsiveness.
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The previous contributions take a good balance of performance and engineering
cost. However their propositions only focus on the combinations of specific RTOSes and
GPOSes, and do not consider neither the portability of applications developed for various
OSes nor the portability of OSes themselves. From the aspect of accommodating diverse
combinations of RTOSes and GPOSes together into a single embedded device, portability
should be the primary concern of manufacturers. The advantage of minimizing modi-
fications to OS kernels reduces the possibility of introducing new bugs into virtualized
systems. Furthermore, it helps updating the virtualized OSes for bug fixes and security
patches.
4.6 Summary
This chapter we introduced our light-weight virtualization methodology which achieves
low overhead and low engineering cost for constructing multi-OS embedded systems. In
addition we evaluated the real-time responsiveness of a RTOS running concurrently with
Linux under various loads. We proposed two methodologies to mitigate the performance
interference from Linux to the RTOS; the IPL assignment and the virtual core migration.
The evaluation shows that our methodologies reduced the interrupt delays. Especially on
multicore system, Linux sharing a core with a RTOS increases processor intensive applica-
tions. However with application triggering frequent system calls may lose its performance
due to the frequent virtual core migration among physical cores.
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Chapter 5
Core-local Memory Assisted
Protection
In the previous chapter we introduced a light-weight multi-OS architecture without sup-
port of a hypervisor. In order to reduce the overhead of using a pure-hypervisor, our
method runs a RTOS and GPOS kernel within the same privileged level. However, al-
though the security between the RTOS and GPOS is not necessary, it is useful to provide an
isolated execution environment that enables running security monitors unexploitable from
guest kernels. Instead of relying on approaches based on traditional pure-hypervisors, we
propose a novel approach that leverages some architectural features. We discuss a minimal
set of hardware functionality to run security monitors safely. In addition to the hardware
functionality, we proposed a software method to keep the integrity of the monitors by
tracking the identity of their memory pages.
5.1 Background
It is crucial for modern operating systems to protect not only applications but also itself
from malicious attacks. Especially, rootkits target a kernel to hide its malicious activities.
This makes security monitors running in a user-level diﬃcult to detect attacks, since
monitors relies on the integrity of the underlying kernel [42]. For instance a rootkit may
compromise the kernel’s data structures so that it would not appear in a list of processes,
or prevent the monitor to be scheduled. The problem inspired some researches to migrate
monitors outside the kernel with help of virtualization technologies.
With help of a virtualization technology, monitors can run within a hypervisor
or within a virtual machine instance. The monitor runs in a higher privileged than the
monitored virtual machine (we call it a target system) or an independent virtual machine
that is isolated by means of address space translation. However there are some shortages
on the monitoring with hypervisors.
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• As hypervisors become more functional, their code sizes are increasing. The large
code size of a hypervisor makes it prone to vulnerabilities. Now the monitor’s safety
is depending on the underlying hypervisor, similar to the dependency between user-
level applications and the underlying kernel.
• Furthermore the large code size makes hypervisor’s behavior unpredictable, conse-
quently makes it diﬃcult to schedule virtual machines in real-time. As we discussed
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we claim hypervisors that use additional privileged
level does not fit use in embedded systems.
In this chapter, we introduce a method to protect monitoring system without sup-
port of hypervisor. We propose a processor equipped with a memory area that is accessible
only from a specific processor core. This memory area is designed to be private to the
core, which cannot be reconfigured accessible from the other cores. This is called a core-
local memory. We give a few additional limitation to the functionality of the processor
to make the local memory inaccessible even from privileged programs like OS kernels and
maliciously promoted rootkits, thus the monitor runs safely within its private space.
In addition we propose a method to virtually extend the space available on the
core-local memory; we call the method the secure paging. The idea of the secure paging
is similar to the disk swap mechanism of GPOSes. Instead of swapping data between
memory and disk, our method swaps memory pages between local memory (private to the
core) and the main memory (shared among cores). Those pages stored in the shared main
memory can be corrupted by the other cores. In order to track their integrity, the secure
paging calculates the hash values of those pages.
The combination of the core-local memory and the secure paging allows running
monitors safely without help of hypervisors. In addition it keeps the integrity of the mon-
itoring system even from the attack privileged code, especially from maliciously promoted
malware.
5.2 The LLM Architecture
The secure pager’s method is twofold. In this section, we introduce the hardware feature
necessary for executing security monitors, which we call the LLM architecture. In order to
utilize the core-local memory for securely running a monitor, we need to ensure the code
of the monitor to be executed in the local memory and to prevent it from being altered or
halted by the malicious programs running on the other cores.
A symmetric multicore processors (SMPs) are equipped with several cores that have
symmetric access to the shared main memory. In order to reduce their access latency to
the main memory, each core is equipped with a small memory region to store a portion of
main memory, usually known as a cache. The caches on diﬀerent cores may refer to the
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same region of the main memory. This might cause the data inconsistency among cores.
SMP supports data cache coherency mechanism to ease the management of caches. If a
core modifies shared data, the copies of it residing in the other cores are updated or their
values are disabled.
The increasing number of cores motivates redesigning processors to support loose
coherency among cores. Along with the expansion in the number of cores, the area on
a chip for inter-core communication (network) may drastically increase. A strict cache
coherency model is expensive to be supported in the upcoming many-core architectures.
There are some real-world processors that support local memory. Hitachi’s RP1 [67] and
RP2 [37] are equipped with core-local memory . Intel has announced SCC, which has sets
of dual cores sharing a non-coherent cache area [10, 11, 12]. Each core is equipped with
a small portion of memory that is private to it. The contents of the core-local memory
can be accessed only by the core that has the memory. The core-local memory is isolated
from the other cores. In addition to the private access, some real-world local memories
supports remote access from the other cores. Within a few cores, the remote access may be
reasonable but with dozens of cores, connecting the cores will dominate large area on the
die. Therefore the LLM architecture advocates the design of isolating core-local memory.
The size of the core is typically a few hundred kilobytes. Note that core-local memory
is not synchronized with the main memory like a cache memory. The program should
explicitly transfer data between the core-local and main memory.
In the normal SMP processor, cores have equal privileges. Any core can force other
cores to branch to a specified address. This feature is used to reschedule a program from
one core to another, also to start the cores during the system’s bootstrap and to recover
a core that is stopped in infinite loop. The LLM architecture breaks this assumption; one
core runs in a higher privilege than the others. In this dissertation we call the privileged
core core0, and the others coreU in the track of virtualization terminology. In the LLM
architecture the core that hosts a security module (core0) gains a higher privilege than
the other cores (coreU). The privileged core has the following features:
• First the core is ensured to be booted in advance of the other cores. With this feature,
the privilege core can safely initialize itself without being compromised by the other
malicious applications. The computer starts the initial code with core0. The BIOS
with Trusted Platform Module (TPM) features can enforce core0 to execute verified
program. Core0 contains the security monitor into the local memory to the local
memory and then start the other coreUs. The usage of this features is described in
detail in Section 5.3.
• Next, it cannot be reset by the other unprivileged cores. This ensures the monitor
not to be deactivated by malicious code, and not to execute malicious code that tries
to access the core-local memory.
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In addition to the hardware extension, some critical data structures should be
managed carefully by software in order to pin down the security monitor on the privileged
core.
• The security monitor should place interrupt and exception vector tables in the local
memory so to make it immutable from coreUs. Interrupts and exceptions can po-
tentially change the execution path of a core. For instance, if a malicious program
(running on coreU) modifies the interrupt vector table contained in the main mem-
ory, the attacker can modify the vector’s entry to point some malicious code. By
protecting the table, core0 can safely handle the interrupts sent from coreUs.
• Page tables must be contained in the local memory. If page tables are contained in
the shared main memory, exploited to coreUs, malicious applications may modify
them to let the monitor execute arbitrary code.
Unfortunately we don’t have a real implementation of the LLM architecture now.
However the strength of our idea is that it is applicable to the existing SMP architecture
with some slight modifications and without updating the core instruction set architecture.
The core-local memory is already implemented on some hardware. The remote access
can be disabled easily by disconnecting the data path among cores; in other words it is
more straightforward to design an SMP with core-local memory that does not support
remote accesses. For the privileged core we need to modify the interrupt controller of the
processor to simply ignore the signals that reset and halt core0. Again here we claim that
the LLM architecture is a reasonable extension to the existing SMP architecture.
5.3 The Secure Paging
In the previous section we introduced the LLM architecture which executes a program
stored in a core-local memory safely without support of a hypervisor. However, by the
LLM architecture itself, the size of the local memory bounds the size of the monitor that
can be executed on top of it. It is inflexible to limit the size of the monitor by the amount
of an available hardware resource. For instance, the size of local memory would vary from
processor to processor. In addition, the size of the monitor might be significantly larger
than the size of the local memory; the monitor may refer to some large data structures
that describe the behavior of malicious applications (e.g. virus definitions). In order to
mitigate the size limitation of the LLM architecture, we propose the secure paging that
virtually extends the size of a core-local memory. s
The secure paging dynamically swaps memory pages between a core-local memory
and a shared main memory. The idea is similar to paging: swapping memory pages
between memory and a disk storage. The monitor’s pages are mostly stored in the main
memory, and loaded into the core-local memory when they are accessed. This way, we
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Figure 5.1: Loading the pager, the monitor and the target OS.
can assign memory space larger than the core-local memory. However the pages located
in the shared main memory, that are accessible from all cores including coreUs, should be
protected from malicious attacks. The secure paging prevents executing modified program
by tracking the integrity of each memory page.
We explain the mechanism of the secure paging step by step. A boot loader first
loads an initial program from a storage to the local memory. We assume the integrity of the
initial program is guaranteed with the help of the LLM architecture described in Section
5.2. A small strip of code is copied into the core-local memory and executed there for the
remaining lifetime of the system. We call it the secure pager or simply the pager. The
pager then loads the kernel image of the monitor and target into the shared main memory.
For explanation, we take the setup shown in Figure 5.1, core0 executes the monitor and
core1 executes the target OS. Core0 is a privileged core and core1 is unprivileged core,
coreU. At this point core1 is not started so there is no malicious activities that interfere
the setup of the pager. The figure is a simplified model and the does not represent the
real memory allocation and consumption.
The pager, first calculates the hash value of each page that belongs to the monitor
(Figure 5.2). Those hash values are stored into the hash table allocated in the local
memory. A hash value is the digest of the corresponding page. It is infeasible to update
the contents of the page without changing its hash value. Furthermore, It is infeasible
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Figure 5.2: The pager calculates the hash value of each page. The target OS is not
activated at this point.
to inject a meaningful code into a page without changing the hash value. Hence, if the
hash value remains constant, the pager can consider the page is unmodified and contains
a coherent data. It is up to the developer to select which hash algorithm. The developer
should consider some trade-oﬀs among cryptographic hash algorithms. The diﬃculty of
the hash algorithm may improve the security of the system, however on the other hand
it may add overhead to each swap-in to the core-local memory and swap-out to the share
main memory. In addition larger size of a hash value consumes larger memory space in
the core-local memory. The maximum memory footprint of the monitor is bounded by the
size of the core-local memory that is allocatable to the hash table. We can mitigate this
limitation by storing hash tables in the shared main memory and tracking the integrity
of the table similarly to the pages of the monitor. Since this method complicates the
algorithm of the secure paging, we focused on the experiment with the first basic idea and
left the extension as our future work.
Next the pager initializes core0 to keep track of the activity of the monitor (Figure
5.3). The pager uses page faults to interpose the memory accesses of the monitor. The
pager must allocate page tables and trap vector tables in the core-local memory in order
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Figure 5.3: Execute the entry of the monitor and trap into the pager.
to protect these critical data structures tampered by malicious programs. Otherwise, if a
page table remains in the shared main memory, a malicious application can modify the
entry in the table to map a tampered text into the monitor and overwrite handler with
its own function. With the Intel architecture, which we used in the experiment, the pager
also need to locate descriptor tables in the core-local memory.
In the example we assume that the monitor is executed in a single virtual address
space which maps the physical pages of the monitor flatly to a corresponding virtual
address. This is the most simple case for managing the monitor’s address space. If the
monitor is a simple program that runs in a single address space, the pager can occupy
the MMU. If the monitor uses multiple address spaces or run under an OS that provides
dedicated address space for each process, the pager must interpose operations to MMU
and page tables in order to enforce the limitations, not to allocate page tables in the shared
main memory and not to map pages in the shared main memory directly to the monitor’s
address space.
Since all the entries of the page table is initialized as unmapped, the monitor
immediately triggers a page fault at its entry point. Receiving the page fault, first the
pager copies a corresponding page, which is stored in the shared memory, into the buﬀer
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Figure 5.4: The pager swaps in a page while calculating its hash value, and checks if the
page is altered.
allocated in the local memory. Next the pager calculates the cryptographic hash value of
the page loaded in the buﬀer. In Figure 5.4, the pager loads the first text page of the
monitor into the core-local memory. The hash value of the text page is calculated and
compared with the value stored in the hash table. In order to calculate the hash value
safely, the pager should first copy the page into the local memory and then calculate its
hash value. If the pager directly calculates the hash value of the page in the shared main
memory, the page could be tampered before it is copied to the buﬀer in the core-local
memory. Depending on the cryptographic hash algorithm, the pager can calculate the
hash value along with copying the page. In this case, tampering the page during the copy
may change the resulting hash value, which can be detected by the pager as an malicious
update.
The pager tags the loaded page with the physical address of the page. This physical
address is used to index the corresponding entry of the hash table when writing back the
page to the shared main memory.
As shown in Figure 5.5, if the calculated hash value matches the pre-calculated
value, the pager maps the copied page to the address space and resumes the execution.
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Figure 5.5: The pagers maps the checked page into the address space.
When the monitor accesses another page that also triggers a page fault, it is similarly
copied, hashed, checked, mapped and resumed. The pager and the monitor repeat these
phases and keeps the integrity of the monitor during its execution.
Note that the pager only keeps track of the integrity of the monitor; not the target
OS. We would like to remind that the pager is in charge of checking the integrity of the
monitor and the monitor is in charge of checking the integrity of the target OS. This
dependency is similar to the dependency of the hypervisor based monitoring, which the
integrity of the monitor is depending on the underlying hypervisor, and the monitor is
checking if the OS is exploited or not. It depends on the monitor’s ability to detect the
malicious attacks against the target OS. We are not proposing a novel OS monitoring but
instead introducing a method to securely host a monitor and a target OS without support
of a hypervisor. The diﬀerence is that in the secure paging, the target OS cannot gain a
privilege to access the pager since the program in the core0’s local memory is isolated by
means of the LLM architecture. In the hypervisor based approach, the target OS kernel
dynamically interacts with the hypervisor that is vulnerable.
If a page fault is triggered when there is no free space in the core-local memory, it
needs to evict a page back to the shared main memory (Figure 5.6). The pager calculates
59
!"#$%&&#"?!"#$%&'()**#+,,(-.&/+?
'()*+'%,#"-?
.#"%+/?
0#$(1+'%,#"-+20'3'4?
01203?
4)0)35?
4)0)65?
01206?
7)819?
:)-:?
7)81(0);<1-?
01203?
01206?
0120=?
0120>?
4)0)35?
4)0)6?
4)0)=?
4)0)>?
.#"%+5?
4)0)?6(&7%&?
3?36=>?
3?@ABC?
3?DE);?
3?F41G?
/89999?
3?;;;;?
3?FFFF?
3?4444?
3?
6?
=?
>?
@?
A?
B?
C?
3?
6?
=?
>?
@?
A?
B?
C?
01203?
01206?
HI!)<H4?
HI!)<H4?
4)0)35?
4)0)65?
HI!)<H4?
HI!)<H4?
6(&7%&?
6(&7+:+;<=( %?
?@(<+#A>?
'#*)>#"? B?+C+D##>E)>?
Figure 5.6: The pager tries to evict a page contained in the local memory to the main
memory.
the hash value of the page and updates the value stored in the hash table. As we mentioned
above, copying and calculating the page can be done at the same time. We can adopt
several optimizations to improve the performance of the page eviction. First, the pager
can omit updating the hash value and writing back the page to the shared main memory
if the page is unmodified. The pager can retrieve page’s update from the access bit of
a page table entry. Usually the text area of the program is constant, thus it is freed
immediately without hashing and copying on its eviction. Next, the algorithm of selecting
a page to evict is also crucial to the performance of the secure paging. For the general
case LRU algorithm might suit our purpose. If the pager can predict the behavior of the
monitor, the pager can optimize its decision to select a free page. Furthermore developers
can modify the monitor to align its functions to the page boundary and reallocate some
frequently accessed data structures to fit into a single page. These optimizations are trade-
oﬀ between performance and engineering cost. Optimizing the performance of a monitor
running under the secure paging is a challenging topic, however we do not discuss it in
detail in this paper, remain it as future work.
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Figure 5.7: The pager detects a data page that is tampered by a malicious application
running on the target OS.
5.3.1 Threat Detections
If the malicious code running on coreUs compromises the monitor’s pages, the modification
is detected when those page are next swapped into the core-local memory of core0. When
the monitor detects an unmatched hash values, it will report security risk. Figure 5.7
shows an example that the attacker exploits the target OS and then trying to modify
the data page of the monitor. The detection is delayed until the page is loaded in the
core-local memory. This means the secure paging cannot detect attacks immediately. In
order to reduce the windows of time to detect the malicious modifications, we can force the
pager to periodically hash each page on the shared main memory. Surprisingly we found
an eviction accidentally overwriting a tampered page with the original page. Also in this
case, the page is recovered silently, thus the pager cannot detect the attack. Compared
with some other intrusion detection systems, the secure pager’s purpose is to guarantee
the execution of untampered program. As we mentioned above, the pager is in charge of
keeping the integrity of the monitor, but not the target OS. The monitor is in charge of
detecting the rootkit in the target. We assume rootkits are more likely to attack some
critical data structures of the monitor, that tend to be accessed frequently by the monitor,
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which is detectable from the pager. Our method is free to select the method of monitor,
like the hypervisor, therefore the accuracy of the monitor is out scope in this paper. We
show our architecture is capable of hosting some existing monitoring methods in the next
section.
5.4 Implementation
As a proof of concept, we applied our method to the two real-world OSes that runs on
the QEMU machine emulator, without support of a hypervisor. As a target OS, we use
Linux. As the monitoring OS, we use xv6. For some case studies we installed rootkits into
Linux. xv6 runs a monitor that is in charge of checking the integrity of Linux. Without
the support of the secure pager, the monitor can be directly modified by malware that has
the kernel privilege. Since there are no real-world processor that fulfills the requirement
of the LLM architecture, we assume a specific area of memory is assigned to the first core
(core0) and not accessible from the others. For the ease of experiment, we developed our
system on top of a machine emulator QEMU.
In order to run two kernels on a bare metal processor, we applied some modifications
to both OSes. The method is similar the method of the logical partitioning [54].
The first modification is to reconfigure the OSes to allocate separate physical mem-
ory areas. In contrast to hypervisors, in the logical partitioning physical memory space is
not virtualized therefore the OSes must voluntary select the range of physical memory to
use (Fig.5.8).
Another modification is to limit the processors to use. In the logical partitioning,
OS kernels would not migrate among cores. In our implementation, we modified xv6 to
run on core 3 and Linux to dominate the remaining 3 cores. Core 3 is treated as core0. In
the x86 architecture, core 0 always starts first. xv6 first runs on core0 than immediately
migrates to core3. The initial steps are diﬀerent from the theory however the xv6 can
safely migrate to core3 without interfered by Linux.
In addition, some peripherals should be assigned exclusively. Linux is modified
not to interfere xv6’s serial communication. The serial communication is not mandatory
because the monitor continuously accesses the target’s memory and not the other periph-
erals. Malicious attack may reconfigure the serial channel and even more send a false
messages. This could be prevented by encrypting the message so that the monitor and the
administrator can detect altered messages. The safe way of assigning a communication
channel to core0 needs some more limitations or additional hardware extensions.
The design of the secure pager (as described in Section 5.3) installs a modularized
pager into the local memory. However in the experiment, we used xv6 kernel itself as the
pager and its applications as monitor. In the modularized design the executive protects
the entire monitor including the xv6 kernel. However in the modularized design, only
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the exclusive is in charge of managing the address space. In the real implementation
the xv6 kernel dynamically updates page tables. Therefore it makes hard to clearly split
the functionality of executive and monitor. This might be resolved by leveraging the
technique of shadow paging, which we did not implement in this dissertation. Some
main data structures of the kernel is statically allocated in the local memory. The kernel
assigns unmapped page to the applications. The corresponding page frames are allocated
in the shared main memory. If the application triggers a page fault, the kernel copies the
corresponding page frame into the local memory and calculates the hash value. If there
is no free space available in the local memory, it swaps out a page to the shared main
memory.
We modified the xv6 kernel to treat some critical data structures in special manners.
First, we had to pin-down kernel stacks to the local memory in order to avoid nested
traps. A kernel stack always resides in the local memory and would never be paged out.
The Intel architecture implicitly saves some register values on the current stack when it
receives interrupts and traps. If the stack is paged out, it crashes with double fault. This
is the limitation of the Intel architecture we use in the experiment. In order to avoid this
problem, in our preliminary implementation, we simply assigned a stack for each process.
This allocation would waste some local memory area, however in our experiment only
a few processes run on a kernel therefore we can assume the amount of memory to be
small. Next, similarly, the page tables and descriptor tables must be allocated in the local
memory. This is to avoid attackers to modify those structures to let core0 execute some
malicious codes located in the shared main memory. For instance, modifying a page table
entry can remap the xv6 kernel’s page with a page that contains infinite loop to freeze
the execution of the pager. These data structures that may reside on the shared memory
and potentially may change the execution path of a processor core must be isolated by
the local memory, which is not exploitable by means of software.
Linux that runs on coreUs almost equivalent to the normal Linux kernel. The only
diﬀerence is the modification not to allocate the physical memory area that is assigned to
the monitor. Except that, Linux is free to access any memory, storages and networks. We
referenced the method in [54] to apply the modification to our Linux kernel.
5.5 Evaluations
In the experiment, we configured the size of the shared main memory as 1024MB. Linux
is configured to use the first 800MB of the shared main memory. An kernel option is
added to the kernel to control the memory usage of the Linux system. 512KB of memory
area starting at 800MB is assumed as a local memory private to core 3. The remainder is
assigned to the monitor, which is also accessible from Linux (Figure 5.8).
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Linux (800MB)?
Local Memory 
(512KB)?
Monitor?
Core 0? Core 1? Core 2? !"#$%&?
CoreUs? Core0?
Figure 5.8: The memory layout of the pseudo LLM architecture.
5.5.1 Case study
As a case study we installed the following rootkits into the target system. These rootkits
are obtained from PacketStrorm [5] if not specially mentioned. Some rootkits has been
trimmed to support only the essential parts that compromise the target’s data structures.
• adore is a rootkit that hides the existence of files and processes. It is provided
with an interface to control the rootkit from the user-level applications. It achieves
these functionalities by replacing system call table entries with its own version of
system call functions. This malware is originally developed for Linux 2.4 but in our
experiment we ported its key feature to Linux 2.6.26 which is our target.
The monitor detects adore by monitoring the integrity of the system call table. The
system call table of Linux should be unchanged through its lifetime. The monitor
keeps the initial values of the system call table (saved to sys call table). During
the target’s execution, the monitor periodically acquires the latest copy of the system
call table (copied to sys call table temp) and compares it with sys call table.
If there is unmatched entry, the monitor will report anomaly and halts the system.
The following pseudo code shows the operation of the monitor.
void *sys_call_table[SYS_CALL_TABLE_LEN];
void *sys_call_table_temp[SYS_CALL_TABLE_LEN];
mread(sys_call_table, SYS_CALL_TABLE_ADDR, sizeof(sys_call_table));
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while (1) {
mread(sys_call_table_temp, SYS_CALL_TABLE_ADDR, sizeof(sys_call_table_temp));
for (i = 0; i < SYS_CALL_TABLE_LEN; i++) {
if (sys_call_table[i] != sys_call_table_temp[i])
alert();
}
}
• knark provides a file hiding functionality by replacing some system call table entries
with malicious functions. We could detect its attack with the integrity checking
described above.
• adore-ng provides some functionalities similar to adore but with a diﬀerent mech-
anism; adore-ng compromises function pointers that are related to Linux’s virtual
file system. Especially in our experiment, we focused on adore-ng updating lookup
function pointer, which saved in the inode operation table of the proc virtual file
system. The replaced function would not return the ID of the hidden processes, so
they would neither appear in the /proc directory nor in the result of ps command.
We implemented the monitor to keep checking the value of proc root.proc iops->lookup
not be modified during the target’s execution. The monitor is implemented in a naive
way; hard coded to read the fixed pointers. However in addition, as presented in
SBCFI [50] and OSck [33] papers, these constant pointers can be extracted auto-
matically by analyzing the source code and the on-line memory image of the target.
• hideme and pidmap-hideme rootkits modifies the data structures referenced when
listing the entries in the /proc directory[33]. The process IDs of running processes
are managed with two kernel data structures: pidhash and pidmap. hideme removes
an entry from pidhash so the corresponding process ID would not appear in the
/proc directory. pidmap-hideme clears a bit that represents the use of corresponding
process ID, so searching IDs would skip the number as if is not allocated by any
process. Hiding its ID, malicious process can remain in the task list while not listed
in the /proc directory. Our monitor detects the hidden process by traversing all
the entries in the task list, checks each task if its ID can be found in pidhash and
pidmap.
• swipemem is a rootkit that tries to fill out the xv6 kernel’s memory area with
zeros. It runs as a Linux kernel module, modifies page tables to map the target
memory with a write permission; Linux does not map physical address areas that
are outside its allocated memory. We developed swipemem by ourselves to show the
secure pager’s ability to detect malicious memory update from untrusted target.
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Figure 5.9: The result of Unixbench on Linux with 3 cores running beside the monitor
and the secure pager. Normalized to the score of native Linux with 3 cores.
5.5.2 Performance
One of our interests is to estimate the eﬀect of the secure pager to the performance of
the target system. In this section we evaluate how the monitor aﬀects the performance of
applications running on the target, Linux. The evaluations were executed under QEMU’s
simulated environment running on Dell Optiplex 755 with Intel Core 2 Quad Q6600 2.4GHz
CPU, 2GB main memory. As the target OS we used Linux 2.6.32 which is modified to run
cooperatively with the secure pager. The secure pager based on the xv6 kernel revision 4
[22]. The monitor runs as an application of xv6.
Since the monitor runs statically on top of a dedicated core and assigned its own
memory region, it would not directly aﬀect the execution of Linux. The monitor peri-
odically reads Linux’s data structures that may cause contention on accessing the shared
main memory. Figure 5.9 shows the result of the Unixbench benchmark suite [] running
on Linux with 3 cores running beside the monitor protected by the secure paging. The
score is normalized to the score of Linux with 3 cores without the monitor and the secure
pager. The performance is not aﬀected in the most cases, where the worst case 3 % per
slowdown. A few results show slight speedup which is entailed by virtual environment
hosted of QEMU.
Figure 5.10 shows the result of Unixbench on Linux with the secure pager using 3
cores, compared with native Linux running on 4 cores. The maximum computation power
assigned to the Linux kernel is (N − 1)/N where N is the number of the cores. In this
experiment the processor power available for Linux is reduced to Consequently the score is
illustrates the performance degradation around 75% the score when Linux is dominating
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Figure 5.10: The result of Unixbench on Linux with 3 cores running beside the monitor
and the secure pager. Normalized to the score of native Linux with 4 cores.
the processor. The result of whetstone experienced speedup, which is the limitation of the
benchmark. We configured Unixbench to fork benchmarks into 4 processes. The execution
of 4 whetstone processes were serialized on the 3 core configuration but did not calculate
the increased execution time.
5.5.3 Engineering Cost
Table 5.1 shows the amount of modification we applied to the xv6 kernel to support the
method of the secure paging and the ability to load the target OS.
Table 5.2 shows the amount of modification required to run Linux under the LLM
architecture.
Table 5.1: Lines of code modified in xv6 (rev4) to create the monitor OS.
Entity LOC
Unmodified xv6 (revision 4) 8688
Changes to xv6 404
Secure pager 592
SHA1 (from RFC 3174) 539
OS loader (loads target) 146
Total modifications 1681
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Table 5.2: Lines of code modified in Linux to run on the LLM architecture.
Entity LOC
Linux 2.6.32 1431
5.6 Related Work
Hypervisors have been widely used as a research vehicle for monitoring the integrity of OS.
Because modern OS kernels became increasingly large in their sizes, they are one of the
primary targets of malware. As the size of the kernel increases, the possibility of making
security holes increases. Even if an intrusion detection system (IDS) has no vulnerabilities,
malware may exploit an untrustworthy OS kernel and indirectly disable its detection. For
instance, a rootkit modifies kernel data structures to make itself not appear in the list
of processes but still scheduled, so that IDS will not investigate it. The above problem
motivated some researches to run IDS outside an OS with help of hypervisors [25]. The
monitoring service is handled within a hypervisor or within another OS that has privilege
to access the state of the target OS.
There are a number of researches on monitoring the target kernel. Patagonix en-
sures the execution of binaries that appear in the list in the target [42]. In this chapter we
adopted the method of tracking the control-flow integrity of the kernel. SBCFI [50] and
Osck [33] extracts the data structures of Linux kernel and traverse them at runtime. Our
case studies detected malware using the approach based on these researches.
Some researches claim hypervisors cannot be treated as the root of trust. As
hypervisors enhanced their functionalities, like the OSes in the past, their sizes have also
increased. Thus there are some researches on making hypervisors trustworthy. Hypersafe
has enhanced the security by enforcingW
￿
X to the memory of the hypervisor to prevent
rewriting its code [63]. seL4 applied formal verification to a microkernel to prove it is free
of bugs [38]. However their implementation does not meat real requirement. In order to
prevent the state explosion, seL4 does not support interrupts; instead it handles signals
by polling. In addition it is not applicable to the existing hypervisors written in C/C++.
NOVA proposed a minimal implementation of a hypervisor [56]. Making the root of
trust small may secure the overall system, however we still need studies on balancing
performance, applicability and security of these methods.
Overshadow encrypts the pages of the virtualized target so they cannot be obtained
by malware [21]. The plain page is managed by the underlying hypervisor and mapped
to the process that has privilege to access the secret. Overshadow identify the running
process with help of the hypervisor, if the other process tries the access the hidden pages,
they are remapped to encrypted pages. Their method is similar to the secure pager at the
point of providing an illusion of accessing memory pages but in real they are swapped by
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the manager.
The idea of the LLM architecture and the secure paging is more close to the idea
of architectural approaches. Gibraltar [15] leverages a PCI card connected to the target
machine. Monitor runs on an independent machine which obtain the memory pages the
target through the network and monitors its invariants. Alike to our method, the monitor
is isolated from the target. XOM is a customized processor which has a capability of
executing encrypted code [43]. It leverage asymmetric key cryptosystem to encrypt the
code stored in the main memory. It also uses encryption hash to detect the modification of
data. XOM encrypted a module running in the same address space as an OS kernel, whose
integrity is guaranteed but the kernel can alter the module to disable its functionality.
Cell Broadband Engine [53] supports executing an encrypted secret loaded in the core-
local memory of its co-processors (SPE). When SPE is executing an encrypted code,
the other SPE and the main control processor cannot access the local memory. This is
similar to the idea of the LLM architecture. We believe our method can be implemented to
existing processors with minor changes, which requires less eﬀort on developing specialized
architecture.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter we proposed the LLM architecture that provides isolated execution envi-
ronment using core-local memory for securely monitoring the target kernel. Furthermore
proposed the secure paging which enables virtually extending the size of core-local mem-
ory, a method to store the memory pages of the monitor in the shared main memory with
keeping their integrity. The case study in emulated environment succeeded to detect some
real security risks in the target and also the attack to the monitor itself.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Modern mobile devices have evolved to host multiple OSes in a single device. While var-
ious research eﬀorts have shown the advantages of using virtualization in mobile devices,
the role of hypervisors in embedded systems are getting more general as those in desk-
top/enterprise systems. This direction makes the design of a multi-OS embedded system
more complex. In this dissertation we take the position that some applications in embed-
ded system virtualization can be supported with more simple method with help of minor
assumptions on the processor architecture.
We first showed the real-time responsiveness of the virtualized RTOS is interfered
by the underlying hypervisor. Focusing on the real-time scheduling of RTOS and GPOS
running on a processor, we proposed a light-weight virtualization layer SPUMONE which
runs on real-world embedded processor. SPUMONE achieved better real-time responsive-
ness than the previous approach with less engineering eﬀort. In addition the interrupt
priority level assignment and the core-migration reduced the interrupt delay of RTOS
entailed by the activities of GPOS.
Next we proposed a method to host a security monitor without help of pure-
hypervisor layer. The method assigns a privileged core to the monitor, instead of privileged
level, that provide an isolation immutable by means of software. We implemented the proof
of the concept on a machine emulator, succeeded to detect malicious applications in the
target OS and also the attack to the monitor itself.
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